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NOTES
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE: CAN A POPULAR
INITIATIVE CHANGE HOW A STATE
APPOINTS ITS ELECTORS?
Michael McLaughlin*
This Note explores the constitutionality of a proposed popular initiative
in California that would direct the manner in which the state appoints
presidential electors. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution
gives the state legislature the power to direct the manner in which the state
appoints its presidential electors. The issue presented in this Note is
whether a popular initiative qualifies as a "state legislature" under Article
I, Section 1, Clause 2. To answer this question, this Note first examines
the history of the Elector Appointment Clause, with respect to the Electoral
College and in light of the Constitution's preference for representative
lawmaking. Next, it explores the legal development of the clause's meaning
and how the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the term "state
legislature" in other constitutional provisions. This Note ultimately
concludes that the lack of voter accountability for an initiative makes it
susceptible to manipulation and inconsistent with the purpose of the
Electoral College.
INTRODUCTION
The 2000 election reminded the American public that election rules
matter. I Voters were forced to confront the hard fact that the national
popular vote does not elect the President. Instead, the will of the people
runs through the complex machinery of the Electoral College, a conceptual
contraption of weights and counterweights. The dispute in Bush v. Gore2
showed that a dexterous legal manipulation of the Electoral College's many
moving parts could make a President.
* Thanks to Professor Abner Greene for his intelligence, guidance, and indispensable
contributions and my family and friends for their love, support, and, above all else, patience.
1. See Robin Toner, Election Quandary Prompts Pop Civics Test, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
2000, at B8 (describing how theoretical and abstract debates about the Electoral College
suddenly became very real).
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See generally 36 Days: The Complete Chronicle of the 2000
Presidential Election Crisis (John W. Wright ed., 2001).
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No Electoral College rule holds more election-altering potential than
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which declares that
each state shall appoint its electors "in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct."' 3  This provision, referred to here as the Elector
Appointment Clause, gives state legislatures broad discretion to direct the
state's mode of appointment. 4 The legislature can decide that the state will
appoint electors by statewide popular vote, district popular vote, or even by
the legislature itself.5 Before statewide popular vote became the norm in
the mid-nineteenth century, state legislatures experimented with many
different modes of appointing electors. 6 The first presidential elections
showed that this freedom of decision makes the manner of appointment
vulnerable to political manipulation,7 as state legislatures, led by some of
the Constitution's framers, created rules to advance particular candidates. 8
3. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The entire clause reads,
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.
Id. Elsewhere, Article II defines the procedures that electors must follow when casting
votes, the rules by which Congress counts elector votes, and the contingency election that
occurs if no candidate receives a majority of the electors' votes. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
4. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (noting that the U.S. Constitution
does not provide a specific mode for appointing electors, but instead "recognizes that the
people act through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature
exclusively to define the method of effecting the object").
5. See William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 55
(William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003) (2d ed. 1829) ("At present, (1824,) the electors are
chosen by the people in seventeen of the twenty-four states, either by a general ticket, or in
districts fixed by the legislature. In the remaining seven, the legislature has reserved to itself
the power of appointing them.").
6. See Neal R. Peirce & Lawrence D. Longley, The People's President: The Electoral
College in American History and the Direct Vote Alternative 45-47 (rev. ed. 1981)
(explaining that direct "choice by the legislature was the most widely used method in the
first four elections"; popular vote by district was the system "favored by many of the
Nation's most distinguished early statesmen"; and statewide popular vote was rapidly
adopted in the 1820s and became the chosen mode of all but one state by 1836 (emphasis
omitted)); see also McPherson, 146 U.S. at 28-36 (describing the various modes states used
in early elections to appoint electors).
7. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 37 (recounting that the 1800 campaign
"prompted the leading politicians of both parties to rig the methods of choosing electors in
their respective states to maximize their own electoral vote and minimize the opposition's");
id. at 45 (noting that, because legislative appointment "involved no reference to the people,"
when "state legislatures saw a chance that the candidate of their party would be defeated in
the popular choice of electors, they sometimes revoked previous laws permitting popular
election and took the appointment of electors back into their own hands"). See generally
Tadahisa Kuroda, The Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral College in the
Early Republic, 1787-1804, at 83-98 (1994) (describing various efforts by state legislatures
to manipulate the outcome of the 1800 election).
8. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 37 ("Several members of the Constitutional
Convention, men who had declared so confidently in 1787 that they had protected the
election of the president against intrigue and cabal, were at the forefront of the effort."); see
also Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the
Presidency, 90 Va. L. Rev. 551, 583 (2004) (claiming that the electoral system became the
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In modem elections, if the state legislature were to change the manner of
appointment from a statewide general ticket to a proportionate or district
system, the candidate who would have lost the statewide vote would gain a
share of the state's electors. 9 This previously unavailable share of electoral
votes could change the outcome of the national election.' 0 Yet there are
reasons why a state legislature might resist amending its general ticket
system. If the political party that controls the legislature backs the
presidential candidate likely to win the statewide vote, the legislature may
not change the rules in a.way that would harm its candidate. I I Even when a
rule change would benefit the legislature's preferred candidate,
accountability to the electorate might keep the legislature from diminishing
the state's voting power in the national election 12 or from engaging in
partisan rule making. 13
To avoid the obstacles presented by state legislatures, reformers have
sought to change state elector appointment rules by popular initiatives. 14
object of intense partisanship, and that "parties used their political power to manipulate the
process of selecting electors-shifting to legislative selection, or changing the mode of
popular choice, depending on their perception of partisan advantage").
9. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Votescam, New Yorker, Aug. 6, 2007, at 21, 21 (predicting
that the initiative, "if passed, would spot the Republican ticket something in the
neighborhood of twenty electoral votes"); Vikram David Amar, The So-Called Presidential
Election Reform Act: A Clear Abuse of California's Initiative Process, FindLaw, Aug. 17,
2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20070817.html (calculating that the California
district system would have given George W. Bush twenty-two electoral votes if it had been
in place in 2004).
10. See Hertzberg, supra note 9, at 21-22.
11. See Charles A. O'Neil, The American Electoral System 73-74 (N.Y., G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1887) (describing the schemes designed by the state legislature of Pennsylvania to use
manner of appointment powers to manipulate the 1800 election); Peirce & Longley, supra
note 6, at 36-39, 44-45 (noting state legislatures that made the manner of appointment
decision to maximize political preference in the 1800 and 1812 elections).
12. See Judith Best, The Case Against Direct Election of the President: A Defense of
the Electoral College 23 (1975) (describing that the unit or general ticket rule spread and
prevailed generally over a district system "because those states that did not consolidate their
electoral power were believed to have less influence and less strength than those that did
consolidate").
13. In North Carolina, a state where Republicans are the majority party, the North
Carolina legislature is controlled by Democrats. In 2007, the legislature proposed to switch
to a district system. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., GOP's Dirty Tricks Begin, N.Y. Times, Sept.
18, 2007, at A27; Jennifer Steinhauer, Frustrated States Try to Change the Way Presidents
Are Elected, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 2007, at Al; Progressive Democrats of North Carolina,
2007 Legislative Policy Priorities For the NC General Assembly,
http://www.progressivedemocratsnc.org/blog/node/64 (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (resolving
that the Democratic Party of North Carolina will "use all of its influence to encourage the
2007 General Assembly to... introduce and support" a bill to appoint presidential electors
by district in time for its use in the 2008 presidential election). The bill was tabled in
summer 2007 in response to pressure from national Democratic leadership. See Steinhauer,
supra. The bill was sent back to committee in response to pressure from national
Democratic leadership. See S.B. 353, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007) (reporting
that the bill has been in committee since July 30, 2007).
14. Colorado proposed a popular initiative in 2004 that would have adopted a
proportionate system for appointing electors. The initiative, which ultimately was defeated
by voters, would have divided the state's electoral votes to the benefit of the candidate who
2008] 2945
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California citizens proposed such an initiative in 2007 that would enact a
district-based system of elector appointment for the 2008 presidential
election.15  The initiative's supporters argued that district-based
appointment would better capture the state's political diversity, increase the
importance of individual votes, and draw national attention to local issues. 16
However, critics claimed the initiative's rhetoric cloaked a political scheme
designed to benefit the party likely to lose a statewide election.17
Because the California initiative would determine the manner in which
the state appoints electors without involving the California legislature, it
arguably violates Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which
vests this power in "the Legislature" of each state. 18  However, the
Constitution uses the term "state legislature" in two separate ways. 19 The
term "legislature" sometimes refers to the lawmaking power of the state, as
defined by the allocation and processes laid out in the state constitution. 20
At other times, the Constitution uses the term "legislature" to refer to the
formal body of representatives that assembles at the state capital. 21 The
initiative's constitutionality turns on which sense of state "legislature"
Article II addresses.
This Note discusses the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 and
evaluates whether the California initiative violates it. Part I discusses the
proposed initiative's place under California law and examines the Elector
Appointment Clause in historical, textual, and structural contexts. Part II
analyzes the constitutionality of the proposed initiative under this
would have lost the statewide vote. See David S. Wagner, Note, The Forgotten Avenue of
Reform: The Role of States in Electoral College Reform and the Use of Ballot Initiatives to
Effect That Change, 25 Rev. Litig. 575, 587-90 (2006) (explaining how proportionate
systems allow electoral minority candidates to receive a share of a state's electoral votes, and
describing the specifics of the proposed Colorado initiative).
15. See Letter from Thomas W. Hiltachk, Californians for Equal Representation, to
Patricia Galvin, Office of the Att'y Gen. (July 17, 2007) [hereinafter Cal. Initiative No. 07-
0032], available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms-attachments/initiatives/pdfs/2007-07-17_07-
0032_Initiative.pdf. The proposed initiative would rescind the current system that appoints
all fifty-five of the state's electors to the candidate with the largest statewide popular vote
and enact a district-based system. See id.
16. See Electoral Reform Cal., http://electoralreformcalifomia.com (last visited Mar. 4,
2007) (arguing that the initiative is "[r]eally a [g]ood [i]dea").
17. See Hertzberg, supra note 9, at 21-22; Amar, supra note 9.
18. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; Amar, supra note 9.
19. See John R. Koza et al., Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the
President by National Popular Vote 291-92 (2006) (defining the two constitutional meanings
of state "legislature" as "the state's two legislative chambers-that is, the state house of
representatives and the state senate agreeing on a common action" and "the state's law-
making process-that is, the process of enacting a state law" (emphasis omitted)).
20. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372-73 (1932) (holding that laws passed
pursuant to Article 1, Section 4, which gives state legislatures power to prescribe the time,
place, and manner of congressional elections, are subject to the lawmaking processes defined
by the state constitution including gubernatorial veto).
21. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S 221, 227-28 (1920) (noting that, in the context of
Article V, which empowers state legislatures to ratify amendments, the Constitution's use of
"legislature" refers only to the state's representative lawmaking body and precludes
subjecting the legislature's ratification to a popular referendum).
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framework. Part III concludes that because mechanisms of direct
democracy are more likely to lead to unfair and illegitimate presidential
elections, Article II should be read to exclude a state from directing the
manner of appointment by popular initiative.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE DEBATE
The current debate over the California initiative has deep historical roots.
Although the Elector Appointment Clause received little attention during
the Constitutional Convention, it became a source of controversy during the
1800 election due to allegations that the clause was being used to
manipulate outcomes. 22 After many failed efforts to reform the Electoral
College, 23 the clause's meaning remains unsettled, making it a ready
vehicle for manipulation even today. This part examines the clause from
historical, functional, and textual perspectives in order to resolve this
conflict.
Part L.A defines the initiative power under the California Constitution and
describes the mechanics of the proposed initiative. It then discusses how
the initiative could change the national election. Part I.B examines the
clause in original, historical, and functional contexts. It first explores the
original meaning of Article II in light of the purposes behind the Electoral
College and the opinion of direct democracy held by the framers of the
Constitution. Next, Part I.B traces the historical meaning of the clause over
the course of the country's history. Finally, this part describes how the
nature of the function that the Constitution requires a state legislature to
perform drives the meaning of the term "state legislature" in other
provisions of the Constitution.
A. The Proposed California Initiative
The California popular initiative power grew out of frustration with the
corruption and inactivity 24 of representative government. 25 Enacted in the
early twentieth century, the popular initiative was a progressive reform
designed to reduce the control of private interest groups on lawmaking and
22. See O'Neil, supra note 11, at 70-77 (describing the political maneuvering and
controversy surrounding the Elector Appointment Clause in the 1800 election).
23. See Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), in IX The Writings
of James Madison 147, 151 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (responding favorably to George
Hay's proposal for a constitutional amendment that would create a national uniform system
of presidential election by districts).
24. See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 Mich. L. & Pol'y Rev.
11, 14 (1997) (explaining that the initiative was designed to remedy "sins of omission" by
the legislature).
25. See id. at 30-31 (recounting that California was controlled by a few powerful
interest groups at the turn of the twentieth century, and direct democracy mechanisms were
viewed as a way to release the people from the "stranglehold of 'misrepresentative
government"').
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break the legislative monopoly of formal assemblies. 26 The California
Constitution currently provides that the legislative power is "vested in the
California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the
people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum." 27
The Supreme Court of California has interpreted this provision to mean "the
power to legislate is shared by the Legislature and the electorate through the
initiative process." 28  Statutes passed by initiative have equal status in
California with statutes passed by the California legislature. 29
Using this initiative power, California citizens proposed a popular
initiative in 2007 that would change the state's manner of appointing
electors to a district-based system.30 The initiative was designed to go into
effect before the 2008 presidential election. 31 California currently gives all
of its fifty-five32 electoral votes to the winner of the statewide plurality. 33
The initiative would have amended the system by giving candidates one
electoral vote for winning the plurality within each of the state's fifty-three
congressional districts, and awarding the statewide plurality winner the
state's other two electoral votes. 34 Supporters trumpeted the many benefits
of the initiative.35 Critics, though, decried the initiative because it would
have had the practical effect of favoring a Republican candidate who would
likely lose the popular vote in this historically Democratic state.36
However, the initiative's failure to receive the requisite signatures to appear
on a 2008 ballot forestalled this political controversy. 37
26. See id. at 23 (explaining that, although not all progressives viewed the initiative as
an end in itself, they all recognized direct democracy mechanisms "as means toward the end
of removing the corrupting influences which straitjacketed the political system into
acquiescence to the social afflictions accompanying industrialization").
27. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 1.
28. Prof'I Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't v. Kempton, 155 P.3d 226, 240 (Cal. 2007).
29. See Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n v. McPherson, 136 P.3d 178 (Cal. 2006).
30. See Cal. Initiative No. 07-0032, supra note 15, at 2.
31. See id.
32. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Raymond Hernandez, In Ballot Fight, California Gets a
Taste of '08, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2007, at Al.
33. See Cal. Elec. Code § 6902 (West 2008).
34. See Cal. Initiative No. 07-0032, supra note 15, at 2.
35. See Electoral Reform Cal., supra note 16 (arguing that the initiative would be good
for the state because it would return voting power to the people; reinforce the founders'
notion of representative government; make California a "competitive market" for candidates;
bring money into the state; increase the value of independent, local, and rural voters; reflect
the state's "political demography"; and enhance the importance of swing voters and districts;
and because it is "the fairest system possible").
36. See Hertzberg, supra note 9, at 21-22; Steinhauer & Hernandez, supra note 32
(noting that the effect of the initiative would be to give "the 2008 Republican nominee
twenty of the state's fifty-five votes-the rough equivalent of winning Illinois or
Pennsylvania-in this otherwise reliably Democratic state").
37. See Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec'y of State, 2008 Initiative Update,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections.j.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (defining
Initiative No. 07-0032 as "failed" as of February 19, 2008). Supporters plan to resubmit the
initiative to the attorney general. See Electoral Reform Cal., supra note 16.
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The initiative's national impact led both the Democratic and Republican
parties to take the proposed initiative seriously. 38 After reports surfaced
that the leading proponent of the initiative was a significant contributor to
the campaign of Republican candidate Rudolph Giuliani, 39 supporters of
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton mobilized to defeat the measure. 40
Clinton supporters raised $200,000 for an anti-initiative campaign and filed
a complaint with the Federal Election Commission.41 The controversy led
the initiative's drafter to resign and some Republican leaders to distance
themselves from the effort. 42
In addition to engendering this political controversy, the proposed
initiative fostered legal debate over whether the Constitution permits a state
to use a popular initiative to define its manner of elector appointment. To
help answer this question, this Note next explores what the framers
understood the phrase "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct"43 to mean.
B. The Original Meaning44
The framers never expressly said whether lawmaking by popular
initiative was permissible under the Elector Appointment Clause.45
Whether this power is granted to state assemblies to the exclusion of
popular initiative lawmaking can only be determined by examining the
context of the clause. Contextual analysis, though potentially helpful,
requires inference and offers few express answers.
This part analyzes two contextual aspects. First, it examines the clause's
role in the larger scheme of the Electoral College. Next, it queries whether
the clause's delegation to state legislatures was a meaningful element of the
compromise struck in Philadelphia, or whether it was only boilerplate
language that was meant to postpone the controversy of the elector
appointment question to some later date. If the delegation to state
38. See Steinhauer & Hemandez, supra note 32.
39. See id. ("One of Mr. [Rudolph] Giuliani's top fundraisers, Paul Singer, a New York
City hedge fund executive, donated nearly all the money raised so far in support of the
measure-roughly $170,000 ... ").
40. See id. (noting that efforts to topple the measure were led by Chris Lehane, an
attorney close to Senator Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign, who "first raised the alarm
bells.., and then encouraged Howard Dean, the Democratic Party chairman, and other
national democrats to oppose it loudly.").
41. See id. (explaining that the complaint questioned the ties of the Giuliani campaign
because Singer did not immediately reveal himself to be behind the effort).
42. See id.
43. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
44. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as
the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.").
45. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 24 (explaining that the debates never
discussed the limits or definition of the power given to state legislatures by Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2).
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legislatures bears weight in the Electoral College compromise, it makes
sense to use the purposes of the Electoral College to inform the meaning of
the clause. However, if the clause was only meant to avoid debate, it makes
less sense to worry about its consistency with the theoretical purposes of the
Electoral College.46
This part then examines the Constitution's view of direct democracy.
The modem popular initiative did not exist during the framing,47 but the
choices the framers made in creating the Constitution's legislative system
may provide clues for whether the delegation of the power to appoint
electors to the "Legislature thereof' authorizes lawmaking by popular
initiative. To the extent that state legislatures perform a federal function or
implicate a special federal interest when determining the manner of elector
appointment, the federal view of direct democracy might help interpret
whether the proposed California initiative is constitutional.
1. The Context of the Electoral College
In its system of electing the President, the Constitution provides in
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State
may be entitled in the Congress."48 Delegates adopted this clause after
months of debate over the proper operation of presidential elections. 49 In
the end, they settled on a compromise in the twilight of the Convention that
left the manner of appointment decision to the legislature of each state. 50
The delegates left no direct record for why this power was vested
46. See Saul Zipkin, Note, Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State Legislature, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 350, 357 (2003) (arguing that use of the term "legislature" had two possible
original purposes under Article II: either the term "may not have been carefully chosen and
was instead merely intended to give the power in question to the states" or the word "was
carefully chosen specifically to be a delegation to the state legislature, as opposed to the state
executive or judiciary").
47. See Charles Sumner Lobingier, The People's Law or Participation in Popular Law-
Making 358-66 (Gaunt Inc. 2001) (1909) (noting that the referendum and initiative existed
in the American colonies before the Revolutionary War for specific measures, but a general
initiative and referendum power that applies to all legislation did not develop until the turn
of the twentieth century); see also James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State
Legislatures over Presidential Electors, 27 Law & Contemp. Probs. 495, 501 (1962) (stating
that "referendum and initiative were nonexistent" at the time of the Constitutional
Convention).
48. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
49. See Kuroda, supra note 7, at 10 (suggesting that, in addition to the heavily debated
modes of legislative appointment, direct election, and intermediate electors, the delegates
heard "proposals for more than a dozen other modes for choosing the executive, some of
them bizarre"). Hugh Williamson of North Carolina introduced the creative idea that the
legislature should elect "three executives-one each for the northern, middle, and southern
states." Id.
50. See James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention 654-56 (Books for Libraries
ed. 1970) (E.H. Scott ed., 1840) [hereinafter Journal of the Federal Convention] (statement
of James Madison, Sept. 4, 1787) (chronicling the introduction of the basic language of the
clause to the general convention, less than two weeks before the convention adjourned).
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specifically in state legislatures, 51 nor any clear indication of whether this
power rested exclusively in each state's assembly or generally in the
lawmaking power of the state. 5
2
However, the delegates thoroughly documented their general purposes
for adopting the Electoral College. The debates suggest that the delegates
crafted the Electoral College to tailor compromises struck elsewhere in the
Constitution to the unique concerns posed by presidential elections. 53 Since
the Elector Appointment Clause functioned as an element of this chosen
scheme, the general purposes and compromises of the Electoral College
may inform the meaning of the clause.
The delegates built the Electoral College to protect the presidential
election from particular dangers, while still following the basic
constitutional design. 54  Harmony with the larger Constitution meant
striking notes of executive independence 55  and state equality;
56
orchestrating the specifics of a presidential election required hushing the
dissonance of foreign intrigue and corruption 57 through movements capable
of practical execution. 58 Reconciling these indispensable interests would
51. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 24.
52. See Kirby, supra note 47, at 501; Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article H
Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 731, 743 (2001) ("At the
Constitutional Convention, the Founders did not specifically address whether state
legislatures operate independently of their state constitutions when they exercise their Article
II powers.").
53. See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad
Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. Am. Hist. 35, 57-58 (1986) (arguing
that the Electoral College included practical methods to protect elections, but was also
informed by "the need to resolve the central dispute at Philadelphia, namely the large state-
small state controversy"); see also Matthew J. Festa, The Origins and Constitutionality of
State Unit Voting in the Electoral College, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2099, 2115-17 (2001); Joy
McAfee, 2001: Should the College Electors Finally Graduate? The Electoral College: An
American Compromise from Its Inception to Election 2000, 32 Cumb. L. Rev. 643, 646-48
(2001). For a discussion of the practical concerns that motivated the Electoral College, see
generally Peirce & Longley, supra note 6.
54. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 23 (noting how the plan adopted by the'
delegates was a compromise that satisfied different interests).
55. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 365 (statement of
Gouverneur Morris, July 17, 1787) (arguing that, if Congress selects the President, the
President "will be the mere creature of the Legislature"); see also Slonim, supra note 53, at
39-40.
56. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 432 (statement of Hugh
Williamson, July 25, 1787) ("The principal objection against an election by the people
seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would place the smaller States."); see also
Festa, supra note 53, at 2112-13; McAfee, supra note 53, at 646.
57. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 365 (statement of Gouverneur
Morris, July 17, 1787) ("If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of
faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals .... "); see also The
Federalist No. 68, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("Nothing was
more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and
corruption.").
58. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 367-68 (statement of
George Mason, July 17, 1787) ("[A] government which is to last ought at least to be
practicable."); Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 21 (noting that Roger Sherman found the
29512008]
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lead the delegates to reject alternatives of appointment by the national
legislature, direct popular election, and appointment by state legislatures. 59
Although the Convention initially embraced the appointment of the
President by Congress, and the delegates often returned to the mode
throughout the summer, they ultimately rejected it. Their primary fear was
that legislative appointment would make the executive too dependent on
Congress,60 increasing the risk of tyranny through the aggrandizement of
legislative power. 61  Further, delegates worried that Congress could be
easily corrupted and influenced by foreign governments. 62 By August
1787, the delegates finally removed legislative appointment from
consideration.
Popular election, the other primary option early in the debates, ultimately
failed as well for a number of reasons. Some delegates worried that popular
election would disrupt the hard fought power balance between states
reached elsewhere in the Constitution, favoring larger states and the
national government while leaving small states underrepresented in the
election of the President. 63 Others believed that due to the localized nature
of politics at the time, it would be logistically difficult to reach a national
consensus. 64  Further, delegates expressed concerns that the popular
electorate would be too uninformed and impressionable to dangerous
influences to choose the best candidate properly. 65  Finally, delegates
worried that private interests would manipulate the people.66 The combined
effect of these risks doomed a popular election system.
As an alternative to legislative appointment and popular election,
delegates briefly considered appointment of the executive by the state
proposal for direct popular election "impractical" because people would end up only voting
for candidates in their own state).
59. See Slonim, supra note 53, at 47 (describing the failure of the other plans debated by
the delegates before the creation of the Electoral College).
60. Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 20.
61. See The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 311 ("[T]he
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that
no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time.").
62. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 431 (statement of Pierce
Butler, July 25, 1787) ("The two great evils to be avoided are, cabal at home, and influence
from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either, if the election be made by the National
Legislature."); id at 432 (statement of Hugh Williamson, July 25, 1787) (stating that "strong
objections" lay against election of the Executive by the Legislature because it would open "a
door for foreign influence").
63. See id. at 366 (statement of Charles Pickney, July 17, 1787) (expressing concerns
that in popular elections, the most "populous States, by combining in favor of the same
individual, will be able to carry their points").
64. See id. at 366-67 (statement of Gouverneur Morris, July 17, 1787).
65. See id. at 367-68 (statement of George Mason, July 17, 1787) ("[I]t would be as
unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to the people, as it
would, to refer a trial of colors to a blind man. The extent of the country renders it
impossible, that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge. . . the candidates.").
66. See id. at 433 (statement of Elbridge Gerry, July 25, 1787) ("A popular election in
this case is radically viscous. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some
one set of men.., acting in concert, to delude them into any appointment.").
2952 [Vol. 76
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
governments. 67 Some believed that appointment by state governments
could maintain proper separation of powers and strengthen the connections
between state and national governments. 68 It would also offer the practical
benefits of allowing a feasible election process 69 and producing better
candidates. 70 The framers empowered state legislatures to appoint senators
in Article I, Section 371 under similar rationales of filtering popular will and
giving states a role in the federal system. 72 At the Convention, Elbridge
Gerry argued that the Senate's rationale should extend to all the
constitutional election systems to further ties between state governments
and the national government. 73 Yet, despite these arguments, the delegates
67. See The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 80 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
(statement of Elbridge Gerry, June 2, 1787); Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note
50, at 388 (statement of Oliver Ellsworth, July 19, 1787).
68. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 388 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry, July 29, 1787) (noting that allowing states to appoint electors would "form a strong
attachment in the states to the National system").
69. See id. at 418 (statement of William Houston, July 21, 1787) (suggesting that state
legislatures should appoint electors due to the "extreme inconveniency and the considerable
expense of drawing together men from all the States for the single purpose of electing the
chief magistrate").
70. See The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 67, at 80 (statement
of Elbridge Gerry, June 2, 1787) (preferring legislative appointment because the people were
"too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions"). But
see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 283 (2002) (arguing
that the delegates proposed that state legislatures appoint electors in order not to "remedy the
perceived shortcomings of direct election by the people, but to retain the critical link
between the president and the people").
71. The Seventeenth Amendment provided for election of senators by direct popular
vote, displacing state legislative appointment of senators under Article I, Section 3. See U.S.
Const. amend. XVII, cl. 1; Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A
Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1347, 1352-55
(1996) (explaining that the movement for direct popular election of senators was driven by
perceptions that state legislative appointments were corrupt, improperly driven by private
interest groups, unrepresentative of the public will, prone to long delay when filling vacant
seats, and more concerned with national than local interests). Like senatorial election
reform, the popular initiative movement aimed to break the perceived corruption and
unresponsiveness of state legislatures caused by powerful private interests. See Persily,
supra note 24, at 27-28 (describing that some progressives "saw in direct democracy both a
liberation from the railroad trusts which dominated their state politics and the statewide
realization of the dream of government of, by, and for the people" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
72. See The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 364-65 (stating that
the appointment of senators by state legislatures "is recommended by the double advantage
of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in
the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may
form a convenient link between the two systems."); Amar, supra note 71, at 1352
(contending that the framers chose legislative election in Article I, Section 3 to "safeguard
the existence and interests of state governments," to create harmony between state and
federal governments, and, to a lesser degree, to filter popular passion and produce more
qualified senators).
73. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 388 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry, July 29, 1787) ("The people of the States will then choose the first branch [of the
National Legislature]; the Legislature of the States, the second branch of the National
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voted down the proposal for appointment by state legislatures out of
concerns that it would give state legislatures too much influence over the
President.74
The Electoral College scheme of state-appointed electors was crafted as a
palatable alternative that protected against the specific risks posed by a
presidential election and maintained the compromises struck elsewhere in
the Constitution. 75 Particular fears of foreign intrigue and corruption were
diminished through a system of disinterested and geographically dispersed
electors.76 Delegates answered concerns that direct popular vote would be
difficult to conduct and susceptible to irrational decision making by placing
actual voting power in a small and deliberative body of electors. 77
In addition, the Electoral College reinforced the compromises of
federalism and separation of powers.78 The system gave each state a
number of electors equal to the state's combined representatives in the
House and Senate.79  This benefited large states by incorporating the
Legislature; and the Executives of the States, the National Executive."). At other times
during the debates, Elbridge Gerry argued that state legislatures should appoint the President.
See id. at 91 (statement of Elbridge Gerry, June 2, 1787); see also Smith, supra note 52, at
753-54 (describing the apparent similarity between Gerry's rationale for appointment of
electors by state legislatures and James Madison's justifications for the Article I, Section 3
state legislative appointment of senators). According to Hayward H. Smith, these
"fundamental principles of representation" provide the basis for an argument, which he
ultimately rejects, that the framers understood the discretion of state legislatures to direct the
manner of appointment "not as a mere baseline but as an essential and absolute
requirement." Id. at 754.
74. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 428 (statement of James
Madison, July 25, 1787) ("Should a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election have
the same object, or different objects of the same kind, the National Executive, would be
rendered subservient to them."); see also Slonim, supra note 53, at 45 (stating that Madison
opposed entrusting selection of the President to the states, whether by state legislature or by
the executive).
75. See Slonim, supra note 53, at 54 (concluding that the delegates adopted the Electoral
College scheme because it "so successfully blended all the necessary elements to ensure a
safe and equitable process for electing a President and which reserved considerable influence
for the states").
76. See The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 394 (contending
that the Electoral College guards against cabal, intrigue, and corruption by not depending
"on any pre-existing bodies of men who might be tampered with beforehand"; making
ineligible former office holders who might have too great a connection to an incumbent
President; and defining their office as transient and dispersed to make corruption more
difficult); see also Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 22.
77. See The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 393 ("It was...
desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the
qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation. ...
The choice of several to form an intermediate body of electors will be much less apt to
convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements than the choice of one
who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes.").
78. See Kuroda, supra note 7, at 15 (arguing that Article II, Section 1 reinforced the
Connecticut Compromise, which had balanced large and small states' interests by giving
more populous states more seats in the House of Representatives and giving all states,
regardless of size, two seats in the Senate, because the Electoral College ensured that "every
state would have the same weight in presidential elections that it had in the Congress").
79. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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House's population-based representation, while protecting small states by
incorporating the state equality of the Senate system.80 Small states were
further placated by the provision that whenever no candidate received an
electoral majority, Congress would choose among the top five candidates
by each state delegation casting one vote. 81 The Electoral College also
responded to concerns about executive independence by taking initial
appointment powers away from Congress and placing them in a body of
independent electors. 82 Answering specific concerns and achieving balance
among the states led the framers and the states to accept the Electoral
College without serious challenge both during the Convention and in the
subsequent ratification debates. 83
The records provide no direct evidence for why the delegates vested
authority in state legislatures to determine the manner of appointing electors
or whether they intended this authority to be exclusive. 84 Some argue that
the framers vested manner of appointment powers in state legislatures as a
practicable mode to empower the people of the states.85 This argument
holds that state legislatures were empowered less for their deliberative
capacities than for their role as the people's agents and lawmaking organs.86
The delegates often stressed the President's accountability to the people. 87
Further, allowing the state legislature to determine the manner of
appointment left open the possibility that the people would appoint
electors.8 8 Although the debates provide no clear resolution, they allow a
80. See Festa, supra note 53, at 2112-13; McAfee, supra note 53, at 646.
81. See McAfee, supra note 53, at 648 (claiming that small states were thought to
benefit from the contingency election in the House of Representatives where each state got
one vote, while the large states were thought to benefit from part of the distribution of
electors being based on House representatives).
82. Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 22-23.
83. Very few Anti-Federalists criticized the Electoral College. Some criticized the
system as overly complex and the institution of electors as antidemocratic. See David J.
Siemers, The Antifederalists: Men of Great Faith and Forbearance 171 (2003).
84. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 24 (explaining that there was not "any debate
on how the state legislatures should or would select electors-whether they would appoint
the electors themselves, require that they be chosen by popular vote in districts, or provide
for popular vote statewide").
85. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 285 ("Placing the decision in the state legislatures was
intended to give the people the power to select the manner of choosing electors without
creating the perceived dangers of direct election by the people."). But see 3 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 319 (Rothman & Co. ed. 1991)
(1833) (noting that one objection to the mode of appointment was that the President was not
appointed by the people, "so as to secure a proper dependence upon them," but will "in fact
owe his appointment to the state governments").
86. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 285 (arguing that "state legislatures were granted
authority to select the manner of choosing electors not because state legislatures possess
unique institutional competence, but because 'the people act through their representatives in
the legislature' (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892))).
87. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 602 (statement of James
Madison, Aug. 24, 1787) ("[T]he President is to act for the people, not for the States.").
88. See Slonim, supra note 53, at 56 ("[P]roponents of popular election achieved partial
success. Although the election of the president was not to be a direct act of the people, the
state legislatures would be free, if they wished, to confer the choice of electors upon the
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plausible interpretation that, by vesting state legislatures with manner of
appointment powers, the framers sought to reinforce the tie between the
President and the people. 89
Others use the debates to draw different inferences on the meaning of the
Elector Appointment Clause. Some argue that allowing state legislatures to
determine the manner of appointment was part of the larger Electoral
College compromise crafted to balance competing interests between small
state governments and the newly formed national government, and the
clause is a significant concession to state governments. 90 Others argue that
the Electoral College was a politically effective but unprincipled plan made
at the end of a very long summer.91 They contend that the clause was
merely default language that was the product of the delegates' inability to
reach a consensus on any uniform manner of appointment and that no lofty
ideological meaning should be read into it.92 Still, the records themselves
only establish silence and the framers' apparent belief that the Elector
Appointment Clause was not worth debating.
Although the debates provide no clear explanation of the clause's
purpose within the Electoral College, the compatibility of the proposed
initiative with Article II may also be informed by the framers' opinion of
direct democracy. The next section explores the type of lawmaking that the
framers preferred and embodied in the Constitution to determine whether
people themselves."); see also Kuroda, supra note 7, at 15 (arguing that "the delegates
respected popular participation, for their plan made it possible to have popular election of
electors, but they did not mandate this").
89. See James Wilson, Address in the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2
The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
512 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941) (1836) (arguing that, although the
delegates rejected popular vote because they thought it impracticable, by giving manner of
appointment powers to state legislatures the choice is "brought as nearly home to the people
as is practicable"). Wilson suggested that the legislature would enable the people to remain
closely connected to the President, because with the "approbation of the state legislatures,
the people may elect with only one remove." Id.
90. See McAfee, supra note 53, at 648 ("Those who feared a strong federal government
were given a system that allowed states to determine their own method of choosing their
electors.").
91. See John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 799, 810 (1961) (arguing that the compromise of the Electoral College was "a
masterful piece of political improvisation," which the delegates recognized had little value as
an institution). According to Roche, the merits of the proposal were that "everybody got a
piece of cake," which included the concession to state legislatures that they could determine
the mode of selecting the electors. Id.
92. See id. at 811 ("The vital aspect of the Electoral College was that it got the
Convention over the hurdle and protected everybody's interests. The future was left to cope
with the problem of what to do with this Rube Goldberg mechanism."); Smith, supra note
52, at 737 (noting that the parallel language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 and Article V
of the Articles of Confederation suggests that the clause was a default provision); see also
Festa, supra note 53, at 2118 (rejecting the argument that the clause was ad hoc, but agreeing
that, because key issues of the balance of state power had already been determined, it made
sense to leave the manner of appointment decision to the state legislatures, especially with
the widespread disagreement on the proper mode of appointment).
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the meaning of the term "legislature" in Article II is amenable to lawmaking
by popular initiative.
2. The Constitution's Preference for Representative Lawmaking
As with the contextual analysis of the Electoral College, the question of
whether the proposed initiative is consistent with the framers' lawmaking
preferences can only proceed by inferences. The framers could leave no
direct evidence of their opinion of the modem popular initiative because it
did not exist when the Constitution was written. 93 However, other forms of
direct democracy were practiced in the colonies94 and state constitutions
prior to 1787.9 5 The legislative system the Constitution chose to adopt, and
its rejection of available forms of direct democracy, may provide insights
into how the framers would have viewed the popular initiative power.
Although the Constitution derived its authority from the "People," 96 it
placed the powers of lawmaking in elected representatives. 97 Supporters of
this republican design98 believed representative government could tame the
tyrannical impulses inherent in democracies and foster government that
93. See Persily, supra note 24, at 16 (noting that South Dakota was the first state to
create a modem popular initiative in 1898).
94. Lobingier, supra note 47, at 80 (describing the local governance in Rhode Island and
other colonies, where all matters "of common interest[] were brought before the town
meting"). The town imposed a fine of twelve pence on residents who appeared late. Id.
According to Charles Sumner Lobingier, "[I]n these separate towns of primitive Rhode
Island we find all the marks of a pure democracy. The people are not merely the source of
legislative power;-they are the legislatures." Id.
95. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L.
Rev. 531, 555 (1998) (describing that the past practice of instructing legislatures had been
"accepted in England for centuries," used in the colonies prior to the Revolution, and
contained in the state constitutions of five of the original states); Lobingier, supra note 47, at
178 (recounting that the Massachusetts State Constitution of 1780 "was desired, inspired,
and ratified by the people, and framed under their watchful eye by their specially chosen
servants"). Lobingier also describes how the Articles of Confederation were submitted to
the people of the state for instruction prior to ratification by the legislature. See id. at 167-
68.
96. The preamble of the Constitution reads,
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
U.S. Const. pmbl.
97. See id. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."); see also Brown, supra note 95, at 553 (arguing that the constitutional
system was designed to insulate representatives from the popular majority will, noting that at
every turn the framers "buffered majority will, insulated representatives from direct
influence of majority factions, and provided checks on majority decisionmaking").
98. See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 126 (making a clear
distinction between "a republic, by which I mean ... a scheme of representation" and "a
pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person").
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would protect the liberties of all citizens equally.99 James Madison wrote
that the primary threat to democratic government lay in oppressive factions,
majorities that ruled out of self-interest to the detriment of the public
good. 100 According to Madison, "[A] pure democracy... can admit of no
cure for the mischiefs of faction."'' The cure could only come by forming
a national republic built on representative government. Representative
government would "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens" who would deliberate for
the public good. 10 2  Alexander Hamilton described representative
government as the form of government "best adapted to deliberation and
wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and
to secure their privileges and interests." 10 3 Without the deliberative process
of insulated representatives, factions would infect the democracy with the
"mortal diseases" of "instability, injustice, and confusion... under which
popular governments have everywhere perished."' 104
The framers also rejected direct democracy because they believed that the
people were especially vulnerable to the forces of tyranny. Madison wrote
that pure democracy created the danger that at "particular moments in
public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or
some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of
99. See id. at 124-25 (arguing that, whereas "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment," when a majority is
driven by a common interest, the form of "popular government... enables it to sacrifice to
its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens"); see also
Brown, supra note 95, at 554 (noting the "dichotomy between the implementation of popular
will, on the one hand, and liberty, on the other" that existed in the framers' belief reflected in
the Constitution that only a deliberative, insulated body could protect the liberty of
minorities).
100. See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 123 (defining factions
as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community").
101. Id. at 126. Madison further explained,
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of
the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party
or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in
their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.
Id.
102. Id. The other advantage of national representative government was that it draws a
larger number of representatives from a broader geographical area, thereby diluting the
influence of factions. See id. at 126-27; see also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1503, 1525-29 (1990) (arguing that two of the ways the
Constitution filters majority preference-representation and separation of powers-are
absent from the popular initiative).
103. The Federalist No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 403.
104. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 122; see Eule, supra note
102, at 1523 (speculating that, had initiatives been around at the time of the Constitution,




interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will
afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn."' 0 5 Representative
government removed lawmakers from moments of majority passion and
tyranny by making representatives accountable to the public will only in
periodic elections. 10 6
In addition to its philosophical preference for representative lawmaking,
the Constitution also rejected specific mechanisms of direct democracy that
were available at the time. Although several state constitutions gave
citizens the right to instruct their representatives on how to vote on specific
issues, the original Constitution did not provide this right. 107 Subsequent
efforts to include this right within the First Amendment ultimately failed,
leaving the Constitution's preference for representative lawmaking in
tact. 108 Additionally, the Constitution made Congress more removed from
the people than the legislature had been under the Articles of
105. The Federalist No. 63 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 371.
106. See id. (defending the insulated nature of the Senate "in order to check the
misguided career and to suspend the blow mediated by the people against themselves, until
reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind[]").
107. See Eule, supra note 102, at 1523 (arguing that the central problem that drove the
delegates to convene in Philadelphia was "concern over an excess of populism in the state
governments"); Marci A. Hamilton, How Democratic Is the American Constitution?
Republican Democracy Is Not Democracy, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2529, 2533 (2005) (arguing
that, although many state legislatures prior to the Constitution included a right to instruct
representatives, the framers "explicitly rejected the right to instruct, and therefore intended to
set the republican representatives free from the people, so there would not be majoritarian
determination of policy"); see also Cecelia M. Kenyon, Introduction to The Antifederalists,
at xxi, cvii-iii (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966) (noting that Anti-Federalists regarded
"representation primarily as an institutional substitute for direct democracy and endeavored
to restrict its operation to the performance of that function," which drove their inclination to
"regard representatives as delegates bound by the instructions of constituents rather than as
men expected and trusted to exercise independent judgment"). According to Cecilia M.
Kenyon, the instructive model of representation's "major weaknesses were closely akin to
those of direct democracy itself, for representation of this kind makes difficult the process of
genuine deliberation, as well as the reconciliation of diverse interests and opinions." Id. at
cviii.
108. See Brown, supra note 95, at 555 (arguing that the right to instruct was supported by
those who favored a stronger voice for the people, but was rejected by Madison and
Alexander Hamilton because such "a right in the people was inconsistent with the insulation




Confederation. 109 Despite strong objections,"10 the framers consciously
chose representative government as the Constitution's legislative system.I"
However, because the Constitution does not prohibit states from
employing popular initiatives, its preference for representative lawmaking
does not answer the question of whether the California initiative is
constitutional. To help answer that inquiry, this Note next examines how
states understood the Elector Appointment Clause during the first years of
the republic.
C. Historical Development of the Meaning ofArticle II, Section 1, Clause 2
1. Early Interpretations
The ratification debates and the early practices of state governments
present two general themes that bear heavily on the constitutionality of the
proposed initiative. First, the Elector Appointment Clause had an
ambiguous meaning from the beginning. Second, the variety of modes
available to state legislatures under the clause enabled widespread political
manipulation in the first presidential elections. Although 200 years have
since passed, very little has changed.
The lack of definition in Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 let constitutional
advocates alternately interpret the clause as vesting the ultimate power of
choosing the President in the people, 112 the electors,"13 or the state
legislatures. 1 14 Sometimes, the same constitutional advocate would even
offer different interpretations, depending on the surrounding contextual
arguments they furthered."15 In The Federalist No. 39, in which Madison
109. Compare Hamilton, supra note 107, at 2530 (noting that, under the Articles,
Congress consisted of a weak coalition of "loosely affiliated states" that "eventually
disbanded because of its ineffectiveness"), with The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison),
supra note 57, at 368-69 (arguing that the Senate's indirect election and long tenure allows
for a greater level of stability than the Articles of Confederation did).
110. See Kenyon, supra note 107, at cix (describing how the Anti-Federalists believed
republican government needs to have a small ratio between citizens and representatives, and
therefore rejected the Constitution's representative system that was removed from the
people). Kenyon writes, "[W]hereas Madison saw in this process of 'filtering' or
consolidating public opinion a virtue, the Antifederalists saw in it only danger." Id.
111. This is not to suggest that the Constitution prohibits states from using mechanisms of
direct democracy. Although Article IV of the Constitution guarantees citizens of states the
right to a republican form of government, the Supreme Court has never interpreted this to
invalidate state popular initiatives or referenda. See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
112. See Wilson, supra note 89, at 512 ("The choice of this officer is brought as nearly
home to the people as is practicable. With the approbation of the state legislatures, the
people may elect with only one remove .... ").
113. See The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 393 (suggesting
that electors will have discretion to deliberate and make an independent choice).
114. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 29 (recounting that future President James
Monroe believed state legislatures would determine the President).
115. See id. at 28 (describing the "inherent contradiction" in the way the Constitution's
advocates explained the system).
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sought to establish that the Constitution creates a republic where all power
flows from the people, he wrote that the "President is indirectly derived
from the choice of the people," and did not explicitly reference state
legislatures. 116 Yet in The Federalist No. 45, in which Madison assuaged
fears that the federal government will dominate the states, he offered
another interpretation: "Without the intervention of the State legislatures,"
wrote Madison, "the President of the United States cannot be elected at all.
They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will,
perhaps, in most cases themselves determine it.- 117 The clause allowed
enough interpretive leeway for a variety of plausible statements that served
various ends." 18
The Constitution's presidential selection system never prompted the type
of vigorous debate during ratification from which a more certain meaning
of the Elector Appointment Clause might have emerged."19 Even Anti-
Federalists who objected to most of the Constitution expressed few
criticisms about the Electoral College generally or the clause specifically, 120
though a few criticized the system for removing the choice from the people
and obscuring the election within a mess of convoluted rules. 121 As then
noted by Hamilton, "The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of
the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence,
which has escaped without severe censure " -122
Since the Convention and ratification debates failed to yield a certain
meaning of the role of state legislatures under Article II, states began
defining their legislatures' roles in presidential elections themselves. When
the first presidential election took place, the constitutions of two states,
116. The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 255. Madison also
suggested that the President would be the choice of the people at the Virginia ratifying
convention. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 29.
117. The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 294.
118. Even single writings sometimes contained contradictions. In The Federalist No. 68,
Hamilton wrote that it was "desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the
choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided," before writing a few
sentences later that the ultimate decision would be made by "[a) small number of persons,
selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass ... most likely to possess the
information and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation." The Federalist
No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 393.
119. See Smith, supra note 52, at 746 (noting that, compared to other topics, the
presidential election method received little attention).
120. See Kenyon, supra note 107, at Iv (noting that there was a "relative scarcity of
criticism of the indirect election of the Senate and the President"); A Manifesto of a Number
of Gentlemen from Albany County (1788), reprinted in The Antifederalists, supra note 107,
at 359, 362 (obliquely criticizing the indirect election of the President).
121. See Republicus, Letter to the Lexington Ky. Gazette (Mar. 1, 1788), reprinted in
Siemers, supra note 83, at 169, 171 (describing how under Article II "the legislative body of
each state[] is empowered to point out to their constituents, some mode of choice, or (to save
trouble) may choose themselves, a certain number of electors," and later questioning whether
it is necessary that a free people "resign their right to suffrage into other hands besides their
own").
122. The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 392-93.
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Massachusetts and New York, subjected ordinary legislation to a veto. 123
When the Massachusetts legislature passed a law determining the manner of
appointing electors that year, it followed its normal legislative procedure by
presenting that law to Governor John Hancock for approval. 124 Although
New York never reached a consensus on appointment of electors in 1788, it
subjected laws regulating congressional elections and determining the
manner of electing senators to the state veto power. 125  In addition,
representatives in both states relied upon state constitutional procedural
provisions when determining how the manner of appointment powers
would be distributed between the houses of the state assembly. 126 Some
have suggested that these early practices show that states understood
themselves to be bound by their state lawmaking processes when exercising
Article II powers. 127
Even if early state legislatures felt constrained by the processes of state
lawmaking, they exhibited great freedom in determining the substance of
how the state would appoint electors. 128 Under this discretion, they most
commonly chose direct legislative appointment in the first four elections,
finding it to be "the simplest method, since it involved no reference to the
people-that unpredictable and sometimes fickle electorate.' 29
Legislatures also soon learned that the discretion granted by Article II could
be employed to powerful and immediate ends. 130 They commonly changed
the manner of appointment to swing votes to a favored candidate,'31 and the
123. See Smith, supra note 52, at 761-62.
124. See id. at 760.
125. See id. at 760-61 (noting that the New York Council of Revision, which held the
state's veto power, exercised it in regard to a bill determining the manner of appointing
senators); see also Koza et al., supra note 19, at 307-08 (explaining that, although the New
York Assembly submitted the laws determining the manner of appointing senators to the
Council of Revision as part of the normal lawmaking process, the legislature did not involve
the council when electing senators under Article I, Section 3).
126. See Smith, supra note 52, at 761-65.
127. See id. at 759 (arguing that the practices of the New York and Massachusetts
legislatures suggest "the founding generation did not have an overriding respect for the
constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 44 (explaining that the Constitution had
"given the state legislatures an absolute carte blanche in this regard," which they used to
adopt a variety of schemes); see also id. at app. B (charting the distribution of methods of
appointment used by states from 1789 to 1836, and showing that states used legislative
appointment, popular vote by general ticket, popular vote by district, and combination
methods in early elections).
129. Id. at 45.
130. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (Nov. 23, 1788), in 5 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 235, 236 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) (predicting to Madison,
on the eve of the first election, how various state legislatures would appoint electors for vice
president based on their party preferences).
13 1. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 44 ("Massachusetts, for example, shifted its
system of choosing electors no less than seven times during the first ten elections."). The
low point of these moves came during the 1800 election. The New York Legislature, which
had been controlled by Federalists prior to the state elections in the spring of 1800, had
enacted a law in 1796 that appointed electors by the legislature. See Kuroda, supra note 7, at
85-86; O'Neil, supra note 11, at 34. After the Federalists lost control of the legislature in
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results of state legislative elections began to influence presidential
outcomes. 132
Until the popular general ticket took hold in the late 1820s, state
legislatures continued to choose various modes of appointment for short-
term political purposes. 133 This led to calls for amendments to create
uniformity in the mode of appointment, 134 though no amendment was ever
ratified. By the early 1830s, nearly all states used a system of popular
statewide vote, 135 and this rise of democratic sentiment did not permit state
legislatures to exercise the same discretion they once had in choosing
electors. 136
2. Soldier-Voting Cases and the Formation of the
Independent Legislature Interpretation of Article II
The Elector Appointment Clause avoided controversy for a number of
years after the rise of a uniform system of popular statewide appointment
and the end of state legislature manipulation. However, the clause inflamed
dispute again during the Civil War, when the issue arose whether a state
legislature could override its state constitution in order to enfranchise out-
of-state soldiers. 137 In resolving a contested congressional election, the
the 1800 election to the Anti-Federalists, Hamilton wrote a letter to Governor John Jay
suggesting the lame duck Federalist legislature should adopt a district system that would
split the electors. See Kuroda, supra note 7, at 85-86. Jay rejected the proposal. See id.; see
also O'Neil, supra note 11, at 71; Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 45 (noting that the lame
duck senate in Pennsylvania took elector appointment away from the people and into their
own hands).
132. See Kuroda, supra note 7, at 107 (noting that, by 1800, political parties "understood
that state elections, even those occurring several years before presidential ones, affected
crucial decisions about how electors should be chosen and for whom they should vote").
133. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 45 (describing a "bolder coup" by the
Federalist-controlled New Jersey legislature in 1812 in which it repealed the state law that
appointed elector by popular choice and "designat[ed] the electors itself on the very eve of
the statewide election").
134. See 1 Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution 1787-2001, at 80 (John R.
Vile ed., 2003) (noting that forty-two constitutional amendments have been proposed to
create a uniform system to appoint electors by district); see also Letter from James Madison
to George Hay, supra note 23, at 147 (discussing a proposed amendment for a uniform
district system); Rufus King, Amendment to the Constitution, reprinted in 3 The Founders'
Constitution 555 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987). Rufus King, the former
convention delegate, argued that the "election of a President of the United States is no longer
that process which the Constitution contemplated," and that, to restore the original intent, an
amendment was needed to create a uniform district system. Id.
135. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 46-47 (explaining that the move to a uniform
statewide popular system occurred because "democratic ideals had advanced," because it
allowed the ruling party to solidify its political control, and because "adoption of the general
ticket in some states ... virtually compelled the others to follow suit so that their strength in
the electoral college would not be diluted").
136. See id. at 45 (explaining that "parties that used the legislative election to control a
state's electoral votes subsequently found themselves thrown out of office by an enraged
populace").
137. See Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on the Constitutionality of
the Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N.H. 595, 599 (1864); In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665,
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House of Representatives Elections Committee determined that state
legislatures are independent of state constitutions when exercising electoral
powers created by the Federal Constitution.138
The constitutional problem arose out of laws passed by state legislatures
in the 1860s that allowed out-of-state citizens fighting in the Civil War to
vote in federal elections.' 39 At the time, many state constitutions had
provisions that required citizens to be present physically when casting votes
in state elections, and courts were asked whether state constitutions
prohibited the newly passed soldier-voting laws. 140 Courts eventually faced
the question of whether state constitutions could invalidate soldier-voting
laws in federal elections, and the high courts of New Hampshire and
Vermont decided to uphold the laws despite their inconsistency with state
constitutions. '41
The New Hampshire court based its decision on the premise that the state
legislature performs a federally created function when directing the manner
in which a federal election takes place. The court wrote that, because the
power to conduct a federal election is "derived from.., the Constitution of
the United States,"'142 laws passed pursuant to Article I, Section 4 and
Article II are "not an exercise of [the] general legislative authority under the
Constitution of the State, but of an authority delegated by the Constitution
of the United States." 143 The New Hampshire court reasoned that the state
constitution could only limit the state legislature's regulation of a federal
election insofar as it was "referred to and adopted by the Constitution of the
United States."'144 The court characterized the legislature's Article II power
as an "unlimited authority," finding that "the manner of appointment is
lodged, in the broadest and most unqualified terms, in the legislature."'145
Since the state legislature exercises broad discretion under Article II in
666-67 (1864) (upholding laws that allowed out-of-state soldiers to vote in federal elections
in apparent contravention of state constitutional limitations).
138. See Smith, supra note 52, at 769-75 (describing the contested election case of
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 39-10, at 1-3 (1865), in the House of
Representatives).
139. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 667-68.
140. See Smith, supra note 52, at 765-67. The initial question facing state courts was
whether soldier-voting laws violated state constitutions in the context of state elections. On
this question, the state courts split. See State ex rel. Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 398, 415-18
(1863) (reading state constitutional provisions narrowly to uphold a law permitting out-of-
state soldiers to vote in state elections); see also Opinion of the Justices, 44 N.H. 633, 637
(1863) (invalidating an out-of-state soldier-voting law after finding it "in conflict with the
provisions and the spirit" of the state constitution).
141. See In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. at 667-68; Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H.
at 606-07 (holding that the "whole subject is entrusted to the State Legislature, subject to the
control of Congress" and there can be "no ground to question the power of the legislature to
authorize voting for electors").
142. Opinion of the Justices, 45 N.H. at 601.
143. Id.




performance of a federal function, the court found that the state constitution
could not limit the soldier-voting laws. 146
The House of Representatives addressed a similar question in the
disputed Michigan election case of Baldwin v. Trowbridge.147 In Baldwin,
the outcome of a congressional election turned on the admission of votes
cast by out-of-state soldiers. 148 Although the specific issue concerned the
ability of state constitutions to limit the powers of state legislatures to
regulate congressional elections, the House's reports discussed the general
capacity of state constitutions to limit their state legislatures' exercise of
federal electoral powers. 149
The House Committee of Elections's majority report interpreted the
Constitution to give state legislatures power to exercise federally created
electoral powers independent of state constitutional limitations. 150 The
report concluded that, in case of conflict between a legislative act and a
state constitutional provision, the state constitution must bow to the
legislature. 151  The majority report drew a distinction between the
legislative power of the state and the historical meaning of "legislature.' ' 152
It held that, when the Constitution delegates a power to a "legislature," it
gives power to an assembly distinct from a state constitutional
convention. 153 According to the majority report, if a power "was conferred
upon the [state] legislature by the [U.S.] Constitution, a [state]
constitutional convention could not exercise it, or inhibit [a state] legislature
from exercising it."'154
The minority report saw things differently, arguing that the powers
possessed by the Michigan legislature "did not exhaust the legislative
146. See id.
147. Baldwin v. Trowbridge, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 39-10, at 1-3 (1865); see Chester A.
Rowell, A Historical Legal Digest of All the Contested Election Cases in the House of
Representatives of the United States from the First to the Fifty-Sixth Congress, 1789-1901,
at 200-01 (Greenwood Press 1976) (1901).
148. See id. at 200.
149. See H.R. Rep. No. 39-13, at 2-3 (1866) (arguing that the Constitution's use of
"legislature" in Article II referred to the state legislature in its historical sense as the
assembly body proper).
150. See Rowell, supra note 147, at 200-01.
151. See H.R. Rep. No. 39-13, at 3 ("[T]he legislation of Michigan may be sustained
against the constitution of that State ...."); Rowell, supra note 147, at 200; see also Smith,
supra note 52, at 769 ("The majority report of the Committee of Elections is the first and
most comprehensive defense of the independent legislature doctrine ever made.").
152. See H.R. Rep. No. 39-13, at 2-3; Smith, supra note 52, at 770.
153. See H.R. Rep. No. 39-13, at 2-3; Rowell, supra note 147, at 200. But see Smith,
supra note 52, at 771 (finding the House Committee of Elections's majority report's reliance
on the textual distinction between the word "legislature" and "convention" to be "bizarre,"
because it is not inconsistent to recognize the distinction and still think of "legislatures as
creatures of their constitutions").
154. Rowell, supra note 147, at 201; see also Smith, supra note 52, at 771 (describing the
majority report's alternate argument that, even if "legislature" was understood as the
lawmaking power of the state, the state law would still withstand a challenge from the state
constitution because it was enacted under a power created by the Federal Constitution, which
the state constitution had no power to restrict).
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power of the State."' 155 It stated that the legislature in its broadest sense
"signifies that body in which all the legislative powers of a State reside, and
that body is the people themselves who exercise the elective franchise."'1 56
The minority report defined the legislative assembly as "secondary or
subordinate" to the state constitution. It wrote that the legislature is "the
creature of the organic laws of the State, owes its existence to it, and can
rightly do nothing in contravention of its provisions."' 157 The minority
report concluded that the Constitution only confers authority on state
legislatures to act "in subordination and in conformity to that organic law to
which it owes its own existence."1 58
These reports fully articulated the two possible interpretations of
"legislature" in the Constitution. The majority report held that "legislature"
meant the formal assembly body. After examining how the term
"legislature" was historically understood at the time of the founding, 159 and
how the Constitution uses "legislature" in other contexts,' 60 the majority
report concluded that "by the word legislature" the Constitution meant "the
legislature eo nomine, as known in the political history of the country.' 16 1
The minority report instead interpreted "legislature" to mean the legislative
power of the state, which rests in the people of the state to define. Fifty
years after the House reports, the U.S. Supreme Court would develop a
functional analysis to determine which sense of "legislature" applies to a
given constitutional provision. 162  Before developing this functional
analysis, the Supreme Court made its first attempt to define the state
legislature's power under Article II, relying on principles discussed in the
House reports and state Civil War voting cases. 163
155. Rowell, supra note 147, at 201; see also Smith, supra note 52, at 772-75 (describing
the ways in which the House Committee of Elections's minority report used history and
precedent to establish that Article I, Section 4 referred to the lawmaking power of the state
as defined by the state constitution).
156. Rowell, supra note 147, at 201.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 200 (finding probative the "fact that each of the colonies, at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, had a legislature similar to the legislatures of the present
States").
160. See id. (arguing that "throughout the Constitution the word 'legislature' was used
consistently to designate this assembly" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
161. Id.
162. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365-66 (1932) (noting that, when the Federal
Constitution requires a state legislature to perform a lawmaking function, it addresses the
lawmaking processes defined by the state, and when the Federal Constitution requires a state
legislature to perform a special, nonlawmaking function, it exclusively addresses the formal
assembly). Under this analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court sided with the minority report,
finding that, in Article I, Section 4, the Constitution requires the state legislature to make
laws, which must conform with the lawmaking process defined by the state constitution. See
id. at 372-73.
163. See Smith, supra note 52, at 775 (describing how the "independent legislature




D. Supreme Court Interpretations of the Elector Appointment Clause
The Supreme Court has substantially discussed the Elector Appointment
Clause only three times. The first time was in 1892, already more than 100
years after ratification, in McPherson v. Blacker.164 Then, after 100 more
years of silence, the Court spoke again in the cases of Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board 65 and Bush v. Gore.166 However, even in these
cases, the Supreme Court never decided whether or not a state constitution
can limit its state legislature's exercise of Article II powers. In McPherson,
most of the Court's statements concerning the relation between state
constitutions and state legislatures came in dicta.' 67 Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board discussed the clause but issued no holding.' 68
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore,
which relied on Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, only received support from
two other Justices.1 69  These cases, while helpful, are therefore not
conclusive precedent.
1. McPherson v. Blacker
Thirty years after the Civil War voting cases, the Supreme Court
interpreted the meaning and scope of a state legislature's manner of
appointment power in McPherson.170 McPherson concerned whether a
state must appoint electors as a unitary body or if it could appoint them
separately by district. 171  The Supreme Court upheld the Michigan
legislature's decision that the state would appoint its electors through a
district-based system. ' 72
The Court began its inquiry by examining what the term "state" means
under Article II.'73 The Court observed that a "[s]tate does not act by its
people in their collective capacity, but through such political agencies as are
164. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
165. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
166. 531 U.S. 98(2000).
167. See Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the Constitution,
and the Courts 114 (2001) (considering a core statement from McPherson concerning the
relationship between state legislatures and constitutions in Article II "dictum uttered in the
course of holding that the state legislature could delegate the appointment of electors to
voters in local districts").
168. Palm Beach County, 531 U.S. at 77-78 (noting that although decisions of the Florida
Supreme Court "may be read to indicate it construed the Florida Election Code without
regard to the extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2,
circumscribe the legislative power," the Court would "decline at this time to review the
federal questions asserted to be present").
169. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.
170. 146 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1892).
171. See id. at 24-25.
172. Id. at41.
173. Id. at 25 (explaining that "a State in the ordinary sense of the Constitution... is a
political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and
organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and
established by the consent of the governed" (citation omitted)).
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duly constituted and established."' 174  The Court determined that the
legislative power is typically the organ through which the state acts unless it
is limited by its state constitution. 175 The Court therefore found that if,
Article II had read simply that each state shall appoint and "if the words 'in
such manner as the legislature thereof may direct[]' had been omitted," the
legislative power could not have been questioned in the absence of a state
constitutional limitation. 176
Because Article II includes the clause that each state shall appoint
electors "in such manner as the legislature thereof might direct," the Court
reasoned that it can only reinforce the legislature's default role as the means
through which a state acts when directing the manner of appointing
electors. 177 Against the backdrop of the legislature's default role, the
"insertion of those words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in
respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held
to operate as a limitation on that power itself."'178 The Court concluded,
[T]he act of appointment is none the less the act of the State in its entirety
because arrived at by district, for the act is the act of political agencies
duly authorized to speak for the State, and the combined result is the
expression of the voice of the State, a result reached by direction of the
legislature, to whom the whole subject is committed. 179
Although this would have been sufficient to justify the holding in the
case, the Court proceeded to expound on the expansive powers of
legislatures under Article II. By placing manner of appointment powers in
the state legislature rather than in the state, the Court found "the whole
subject is committed" to the state legislature, which "possesses plenary
authority" without state constitutional limitation. 180  According to the
Court, this power "cannot be taken from [state legislatures] or modified by
their State constitutions any more than can their power to elect Senators of
the United States." 181
When the Court used the term "legislative power," it did not necessarily
limit its meaning to the representative assembly. 182 For instance, the Court
wrote, "[T]he sovereignty of the people is exercised through their






179. Id. at 25-26.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 35 (citing S. Rep. No. 43-395 (1874)).
182. See id. at 25 (distinguishing between "representatives in the legislature" and the
"legislative power"); Koza et al., supra note 19, at 311 (arguing that, because an initiative is
"considered a co-equal grant of authority to that given to the state's legislature, the treatment
of the initiative process as a legislative power is consistent with the fundamental law of
states that have the initiative process").
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elsewhere reposed."' 183 In 1892, the year McPherson was authored, the
popular initiative movement was beginning to take shape in western
states. 184 McPherson, therefore, may not foreclose a state from defining its
legislative power to include a popular initiative. 185
2. The 2000 Election Cases 186
More than 100 years later, the Supreme Court revisited the Elector
Appointment Clause during the 2000 election dispute.' 87 The Article II
question presented in Palm Beach County and Bush v. Gore concerned to
what extent a state court could alter the state legislature's mode of
appointing electors through judicial review. 188 A majority of the Court
never answered this question, but the range of the Justices' opinions
showed that the meaning of the Elector Appointment Clause still remained
an open question. 189
On November 21, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court extended a statutory
filing deadline to allow manual recounts in the 2000 presidential election, in
an opinion that relied in part on a right-to-vote provision in the Florida
Constitution. 190 After George W. Bush appealed, the Supreme Court
vacated the Florida ruling and remanded the case. 191 The Court called the
Florida Supreme Court's attention to "the extent to which the Florida
Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 'circumscribe the
legislative power.""' 192 The Court quoted its statement in McPherson, that
while the language of Article II operates as a "limitation upon the State in
respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, [it] cannot be
held to operate as a limitation on that power itself."' 193 Although the Court
183. McPherson, 126 U.S. at 25.
184. See Persily, supra note 24, at 19-21 (describing the move toward referendum and
initiative in the 1890s). South Dakota was the first state to enact a general popular initiative
and referendum in 1898. See id. at 16.
185. See Koza et al., supra note 19, at 311.
186. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 70 (2000); Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla.
2000).
187. See generally 36 Days: The Complete Chronicle of the 2000 Presidential Election
Crisis, supra note 2.
188. See Palm Beach County, 531 U.S. at 77 (considering the degree to which the Florida
Supreme Court could use the Florida Constitution to construe the Florida Election Code and
remain consistent with Article II); Gore, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
("[T]he general coherence of the legislative scheme may not be altered by judicial
interpretation so as to wholly change the statutorily provided apportionment of responsibility
among these various bodies.").
189. See generally Gore, 531 U.S. 98. The Justices wrote six separate opinions, all of
which devote at least some attention to the Article II question. Id.
190. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).
191. Palm Beach County, 531 U.S. at 78.
192. Id. at 76-77.
193. Id. at 76 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
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gave these suggestions, it issued no holding on whether the Florida
Supreme Court had violated Article II.194
The election dispute returned to the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, in
which the Court ordered Florida to stop its manual recount. 195 A majority
of the Justices held that the recount violated the Equal Protection Clause, 196
but three of the Justices contended that the Florida Supreme Court's action
additionally violated Article II.197
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in concurrence that Article II assigns a
special role for state legislatures, and "[a] significant departure from the
legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a federal
constitutional question."'198  Although Rehnquist suggested that the
Supreme Court should still give state courts some deference under Article
11,199 because the Florida Supreme Court's ordered recount departed so
194. Id. at 78 (declining to review the federal questions because of the uncertainty of the
Florida court's decision).
195. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).
196. Id. (finding that "it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance
with the requirements of equal protection and due process" in the time available before the
statutory deadline).
197. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair
reading required, in violation of Article II.").
198. Id. at 113. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist continued,
[T]here are a few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or
confers a power on a particular branch of a State's government. This is one of
them.... [T]he text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation by the
courts of the States, takes on independent significance .... If we are to respect the
legislature's Article II powers.., we must ensure that postelection state-court -
actions do not frustrate the legislative desire.
Id. at 112-13; see also Colo. Gen. Assem. v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093, 1095 (2004) (denying
certiorari) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Constitution requires "some limit on
the State's ability to define lawmaking by excluding the legislature itself in favor of the
courts").
199. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("Isolated sections of the
code may well admit of more than one interpretation, but the general coherence of the
legislative scheme may not be altered by judicial interpretation so as to wholly change the
statutorily provided apportionment of responsibility among these various bodies."); id.
("Though we generally defer to state courts on the interpretation of state law ... there are of
course areas in which the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an independent, if
still deferential, analysis of state law."); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Erog .v Hsub
and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170,
189-94 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist opinion showed some degree of deference to state
court determinations and did not advocate completely removing the state court's role under
Article II).
Laurence H. Tribe further argues that the Court engages in a similar level of review of
state court interpretations in other federal constitutional contexts. See id. at 188
("[W]henever a provision of the federal Constitution specifies something-whether
substantive, structural, or procedural-about how a decision otherwise internal to a state's
system of governance should be made, that provision's enforcement is a matter for the
federal judiciary ...."); see also id. at 193 ("[T]he institutional function of checking the
state court's construction of state election legislation to ensure that federal constitutional
ground rules (here, those of Article II) are followed is unexceptional ... [as long as the
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severely from the legislature's method of elector appointment, it justified
federal intervention to protect the state legislature's plenary powers under
Article 11.200
The Rehnquist opinion suggested that the special character of presidential
elections justify federal review of internal state processes. 20 1 It contended
that while the Court usually defers to a state court's interpretation of its own
constitution, scrutiny was justified in this case because electors perform a
federal function 2 2 and presidential elections have special national
importance. 20 3 According to Rehnquist, Article II therefore requires the
federal judiciary to protect the state legislature's Article II powers from
undue interference by other branches of state government.204
The dissenting Justices attacked the Rehnquist opinion on the grounds
that it improperly interfered with judicial review,20 5 violated principles of
federalism, 20 6 and misinterpreted the meaning of "state legislature" under
the Constitution.20 7 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that because
judicial review is indispensable to republican government, the Court should
not interpret Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 to limit the Florida Supreme
Court's ability to review legislation.208 Interpreting Article II to empower
the state legislature to the exclusion of the judiciary would "disrupt a
Court] reject[s] only manifestly unreasonable state judicial constructions of state statutes and
not simply to substitute its own preferred construction for the state court's.").
200. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
201. Id. at 112 ("We deal here not with an ordinary election, but with an election for the
President of the United States.").
202. Id. ("'While presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal
government, they exercise federal functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority
conferred by, the Constitution of the United States."' (quoting Burroughs v. United States,
290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934))).
203. Id. (claiming that, in the context of a presidential election, state-imposed restrictions
implicate "a uniquely important national interest" because the President and Vice President
represent voters across the nation (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95
(1983))).
204. Id. at 115 ("This inquiry does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a
respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures. To attach definitive
weight to the pronouncement of a state court.., would be to abdicate our responsibility to
enforce the explicit requirements of Article II.").
205. See id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The legislative power in Florida is
subject to judicial review pursuant to Article V of the Florida Constitution, and nothing in
Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the state legislature from the constraints in the
state constitution that created it.").
206. See id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I would have thought the cautious
approach we counsel when federal courts address matters of state law, and our commitment
to 'build[ing] cooperative judicial federalism,' demanded greater restraint. (citing Lehman
Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974))).
207. See id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (denying the independence of state legislatures
under Article II and contending that the legislature is the "supreme authority except as
limited by the constitution of the State").
208. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Framers of our Constitution...




State's republican regime," which is inconsistent with the Constitution's
guarantee that states enjoy a republican form of government. 20 9
Justice Ginsburg wrote that by using Article II to protect one state organ
from another, the Chief Justice "contradicts the basic principle that a State
may organize itself as it sees fit."' 210 According to Ginsburg, principles of
federalism require the Court to show greater respect for the state
constitution than for the state legislature. 211  Nothing in Article II,
according to Ginsburg, justifies displacing the ordinary primacy of the state
constitution over the state legislature. 212
Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the concurrence erred by
determining that Article II gave the Florida legislature powers independent
of the Florida Constitution.2 13 He wrote that the Federal Constitution "does
not create state legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they
come-as creatures born of, and constrained by, their state
constitutions." 2 14 According to Justice Stevens, laws passed pursuant to
Article II are subject to ordinary state constitutional processes, including
judicial review.215 Justice Stephen Breyer agreed that neither the text of
Article II nor McPherson "leads to the conclusion that Article II grants
unlimited power to the legislature, devoid of any state constitutional
limitations, to select the manner of appointing electors." 216
Stevens's dissenting opinion included a footnote that compared the
meaning of "state legislature" in Article II with its meaning in other
constitutional contexts. 217 The next section examines several other powers
that the Constitution gives to state legislatures. The function state
legislatures perform has been central to the Supreme Court's analysis in
determining whether state legislatures remain subordinate to state
constitutions when exercising federally created powers.
E. The Function and the Meaning of the Term "Legislature"
As previously noted, the Constitution uses the term "state legislature" in
two distinct senses. Sometimes the Constitution refers to the lawmaking
209. See id. (discussing the Guarantee Clause in Article IV of the Constitution).
210. Id.
211. See id. at 142 (claiming that the "Chief Justice's solicitude.., comes at the expense
of the more fundamental solicitude we owe to the legislature's sovereign").
212. See id. at 141-42.
213. See id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the independent notion of Article II
state legislatures, and instead contending that "[w]hat is forbidden or required to be done by
a State in the Article II context is forbidden or required of the legislative power under state
constitutions as they exist" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 123 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that Article II is most similar to
Article I, Section 4, which gives state legislatures powers to regulate congressional
elections). The Supreme Court has found state legislative power under Article I, Section 4 to
be limited and defined by the state constitution. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372
(1932); infra Part I.E.
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processes of the state, which can include veto, referendum, or initiative. 218
At other times, the Constitution refers to the formal assembly body of the
state, the group of elected representatives that meets at the state capital. 219
The Supreme Court has created a function-based framework to determine
which meaning of state legislature applies to a given constitutional
provision.220 The Court has held that, when the constitutional provision
requires state legislatures to make law, it refers to "legislature" as the
lawmaking process of the state. 221 In these cases, the authority granted by
the Federal Constitution to the "state legislature" is subject to the state
constitution's definition of its legislative power.222 However, when the
federal constitutional power requires the state legislature to perform a
special, nonlawmaking function, it refers to the formal assembly body of
the state.223 In these cases, the Court has held that this power is not subject
to the normal state constitutional lawmaking process. 224  This section
discusses the meaning of "legislature" in several constitutional provisions to
determine which meaning the Constitution assigns to "legislature" in
Article II.
1. The Function-Based Analysis
In Smiley v. Holm, the Supreme Court outlined a function-based
framework for determining whether a state legislature is subordinate to its
state constitution when exercising a federal constitutional power. 225 The
case concerned whether the Minnesota governor could veto a congressional
districting law passed by the state legislature pursuant to its powers to
regulate congressional elections under Article I, Section 4.226 The Court
wrote,
The use in the Federal Constitution of the same term in different relations
does not always imply the performance of the same function. The
legislature may act as an electoral body, as in the choice of United States
Senators under Article I, section 3, prior to the adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment. It may act as a ratifying body, as in the case of
proposed amendments to the constitution under Article V. It may act as a
consenting body, as in relation to the acquisition of lands by the United
States under Article I, section 8, paragraph 17. Wherever the term
218. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
220. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365-66.
221. See id. at 367-68.
222. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 567-68 (1916).
223. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1920).
224. Id. at 231.
225. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365-66; Kirby, supra note 47, at 502 (interpreting Smiley to
use a "functional approach" to define "state legislatures" to "refer to the lawmaking power of
the state").
226. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 361-62.
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'legislature' is used in the Constitution it is necessary to consider the
nature of the particular action in view.
227
The Court considered whether the power granted to regulate
congressional elections entailed a unique function that justified displacing
the state constitution's ordinary authority over its legislature. 228 The Court
found that federally granted powers that only require the state legislature to
make laws do not justify displacing the state constitution's ordinary
supremacy. 229 The Court concluded that Article I, Section 4 entails no
special function "which precludes a State from providing that legislative
action... shall be subject to the veto power of the Governor as in other
cases of the exercise of the lawmaking power." 230 Therefore, the Court
found that because the Constitution delegates Article I, Section 4 power to
the legislature, as synonymous with the state's lawmaking process, the state
could subject the law to a governor's veto. 231
Sixteen years before Smiley, the Supreme Court held in Ohio ex rel.
Davis v. Hildebrant that Article I, Section 4 does not preclude a state from
subjecting legislation to a popular referendum. 232 The Court found that,
without a contrary congressional act,233 the state could define its legislative
power to include a referendum. 234 According to the Court, the only federal
constitutional question raised was whether the referendum destroyed the
state's republican form of government in violation of the Guarantee Clause
of Article IV, Section 4.235 The Court found this was not a justiciable
question. 2
36
227. Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted).
228. See id. at 367 ("As the authority is conferred for the purpose of making laws for the
State... in the absence of an indication of a contrary intent ... the exercise of the authority
must be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative
enactments.").
229. See id. at 365 (finding the core inquiry to be whether the Constitution "invests the
legislature with a particular authority and imposes upon it a corresponding duty, the
definition of which imports a function different from that of lawgiver and thus renders
inapplicable the conditions which attach to the making of state laws").
230. Id. at 372-73.
231. See id.
232. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568-70 (1916).
233. The Court's inquiry into the powers of state legislatures under Article I, Section 4 is
further complicated by the fact that Congress holds ultimate authority to regulate
congressional elections. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 385 (1879) (holding that state
legislatures and Congress have concurrent authority under Article I, Section 4, and
congressional action controls under the Supremacy Clause).
234. See Davis, 241 U.S. at 568 (finding that, "so far as the State had the power to do it,
the referendum ... was contained within the legislative power").
235. Id. at 569.
236. See id. (determining that the "question of whether that guarantee of the Constitution
has been disregarded presents no justiciable controversy but involves the exercise by
Congress of the authority vested in it by the Constitution"); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912) (holding that the constitutionality under the Guarantee
Clause of state legislation by initiative and referendum is not resolvable by the judiciary).
[Vol. 762974
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
2. Special Functions That Make State Legislatures
Independent of State Constitutions
Although in Smiley and Davis the Supreme Court determined that state
legislatures performing legislative functions are subject to state
constitutions, the Court has defined the meaning of "legislature" differently
when state legislatures perform nonlegislative functions. 237 The Court held
in Hawke v. Smith that "legislature" in Article V refers exclusively to the
assembly body because performance of the constitutional obligation entails
a special, nonlegislative function.238
Hawke considered whether subjecting the state legislature's ratification
of a federal constitutional amendment to a popular referendum violated
Article V.2 39 The Court held that the Constitution conferred the power of
ratification specifically to legislatures to the exclusion of popular
referendum powers. 240 The Court wrote,
There can be no question that the framers of the Constitution clearly
understood and carefully used the terms in which that instrument referred
to the action of the legislatures of the States. When they intended that
direct action by the people should be had they were no less accurate in the
use of apt phraseology to carry out such purpose. 24
1
The Court considered other special functions that the Constitution assigns
exclusively to the state assembly body, including the election of senators. 242
The Court distinguished these special functions from federal constitutional
powers that require state legislatures to make laws. The Court wrote,
Article I, § 4, [regulation of congressional elections,] plainly gives
authority to the State to legislate within the limitations therein named.
Such legislative action is entirely different from the requirement of the
Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a proposed
amendment to the Constitution. In such expression no legislative action is
authorized or required.24 3
237. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365-66 (1932).
238. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1920). The Court affirmed this holding
on somewhat different grounds in Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922), holding that a
state constitution cannot limit the power to ratify because ratification is a federal function
that transcends "any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a state."
239. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 221-28.
240. Id. at 228-29 ("[The term 'legislature' was] not a term of uncertain meaning when
incorporated into the Constitution .... A Legislature was then the representative body
which made the laws of the people."); see also Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
378 (1798) (finding that amendments proposed by Congress need not be submitted to the
President for veto).
241. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 228.
242. See id. at 227-28.
243. Id. at 231. The Court argued that the use of the term "legislature" in Article I,
Section 3, which provided that senators shall be elected by state legislatures, meant
"legislature" not to include legislative powers reserved in the people. Id. The necessity of
the Seventeenth Amendment to allow popular senate elections confirms that the Constitution
originally delegated the power only to the assembly body. The Court wrote,
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The Court also based its holding on the fact that the Article V power
comes from the Federal Constitution, and that in the "act of ratification...
the State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the
State and its people have alike assented. '' 244 Despite its analysis of Article
V, Hawke still recognized that federal constitutional powers that require
state legislatures to exercise lawmaking functions involve a different
relationship between the legislature and the state constitution. 245
The constitutionality of the proposed initiative might therefore turn on
whether Article II requires lawmaking in a way similar to Article I, Section
4, or instead contemplates a special function more analogous to the
ratification of amendments under Article V. Principles of federalism
underlie this functional analysis. State constitutions control the definition
of "legislature" when state legislatures perform legislative functions, while
the Federal Constitution controls the meaning when the state legislatures
perform special functions. The next section considers two additional
questions relating to federalism. First, does an important national interest,
regardless of the function the legislature performs, justify the Federal
Constitution imposing its definition of "legislature" on the states? Second,
does the inquiry instead turn on whether the legislature performs a state
function, in which case the state defines "legislature," or a federal function,
in which case the Federal Constitution defines it?
3. How the Special National Interest of Presidential Elections
Might Alter the Question
In addition to the function that the legislature performs, the federal
interest at stake also drives the Supreme Court's analysis in determining
whether it should hold that a state legislature is not subject to ordinary state
constitutional limits. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Bush
v. Gore argued that the national interest of a presidential election justified a
departure from normal principles of federalism, because "[w]e deal here not
with an ordinary election, but with an election for the President of the
United States." 246 According to Rehnquist, a presidential election presents
an extraordinary federal interest that supports the Court's intervention into
state processes to protect the special role the Constitution assigned to state
It was never suggested, so far as we are aware, that the purpose of making the
office of Senator elective by the people could be accomplished by a referendum
vote. The necessity of the amendment to accomplish the purpose of popular
election is shown in the adoption of the amendment.
Id. at 228. For a complete discussion of the way the Constitution has defined "legislature" in
different constitutional contexts, see generally Koza et al., supra note 19, at 291-335.
244. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230; see also Leser v. Gamett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922)
(holding similarly that a state gubernatorial veto could not limit a state legislature's Article V
powers because a state legislature performs a federal constitutional function when ratifying
amendments).
245. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 231 (clarifying that Article I, Section 4 is legislative action
that is entirely different from the expression of assent or dissent to a proposed amendment).
246. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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legislatures.247 He wrote, "This inquiry does not imply disrespect for state
courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state
legislatures."248 Faced with this fundamental national interest, for the
Court to defer too readily to the state government would "abdicate our
responsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II.
' 249
The sources of Rehnquist's argument are cases that have used the
national importance of presidential elections to justify federal regulation of
state powers under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2. In Anderson v.
Celebrezze,250 the Court found that an Ohio statute that required an
independent presidential candidate to meet an early filing deadline placed
an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of the
candidate's supporters. 251 To justify this limitation on the state's powers to
determine the manner of appointing electors, the Court wrote,
[I]n the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions
implicate a uniquely important national interest. For the President and the
Vice President of the United States are the only elected officials who
represent all the voters in the Nation. Moreover, the impact of the votes
cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in
other States. Thus in a Presidential election a State's enforcement [of
regulations]... has an impact beyond its own borders.252
The Court further found that "the State has a less important interest in
regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local elections, because
the outcome of the former will be largely determined by voters beyond the
State's boundaries." 253 The combination of a strong national interest and
weaker local interest in the presidential election led the Court to show less
deference to the state regulation,
In Burroughs v. United States the Court upheld a federal law that made it
a crime to conspire to corrupt presidential electors. 254 The Court wrote,
"The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The
importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to and
effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too
strongly stated. '255  The Court found that, while elector regulation is
generally a state matter, the national importance of the presidency and the
247. See id. at 112-13.
248. Id. at 115.
249. Id. Some scholars argue that the interpretation of "legislature" should not turn on
whether a special national interest is implicated because under Article I, Section 4 an
important national interest exists but the legislature is still defined by the legislative process
of the state; instead, the inquiry should turn on whether the legislature acts in a state or
federal capacity. See Zipkin, supra note 46, at 369 (arguing that, where the Court has found
the legislature not to be subject to state legislative processes, the legislature has been acting
"as a federal body").
250. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
251. Id. at 794-95.
252. Id. at 795.
253. Id.
254. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934).
255. Id. at 545.
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fact that electors "exercise federal functions" under the Constitution give
the federal government power to protect a presidential election from
corruption despite the states' Article II powers. 256
Although Burroughs and Celebrezze suggest that the national interest of
the presidential election may justify the federal government showing less
deference to state sovereignty, neither case speaks directly to the question
of whether this national interest justifies federal intervention into the
relations between branches of state government or whether a state
legislature is subordinate to its state constitution when exercising manner of
appointment powers. 257 However, this basis for federal intervention into
presidential elections may also justify limitations on state legislative
processes that are relevant to the constitutionality of the proposed
initiative. 258 Along with this issue, Part II examines whether the history,
precedent, and function of the Elector Appointment Clause suggest that a
state can direct the manner of appointment by popular initiative.
II. DOES THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION?
With this ambiguous history, muddled precedent, and complicated
purpose in mind, this Note moves to consider whether proposed California
Initiative 07-0032 violates the Federal Constitution. Several questions
structure this analysis. First, what do the history of the framing and
ratification of Article II reveal about how the framers would have reacted to
the proposed initiative? Second, what do the understandings of interpretive
bodies-state legislatures, state courts, the Supreme Court, and Congress-
suggest about the constitutionality of the initiative? Third, does the
function that a state legislature performs when directing the manner of
appointing electors suggest a certain definition of "legislature" in Article II
that either includes or excludes the popular initiative? And finally, how do
the unique characteristics of presidential elections and the Electoral College
bear on the constitutionality of the proposed initiative?
A. Viewing the Initiative Through an Original Lens
As discussed in Part I, the record of the debates and ratification of the
Constitution left behind no definitive meaning of the term "legislature" in
Article II's Elector Appointment Clause. 259 However, the history suggests
several possible purposes for the chosen language of the clause. Article II
may have vested this power in the legislatures of the states to tie the
256. Id.
257. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 141-42 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258. See infra Part II.D.
259. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 24 (describing how the "knotty problem" of
the manner of elector appointment, "which would cause endless debates and maneuvers in
the state legislatures in the ensuing years, was completely ignored"); Kirby, supra note 47, at
501; Smith, supra note 52, at 743.
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election as closely as possible to the people. 260 According to this view, the
presidential election served to connect the President to the people.26 1 After
direct popular election proved infeasible, vesting manner of appointment
powers in state legislatures, along with actual election powers in electors,
was part of a next-best, pragmatic strategy to give the election to the people
as much as the Constitution possibly could. 262 In opposition to the popular
surrogate interpretation of "legislature," Article II may have specifically
used the term "legislature" to refer exclusively to the assembled body of
representative lawmakers as a means to filter the popular will and reinforce
the tie between the federal and state governments. 263 Several delegates
used these rationales to justify placing other powers in state legislatures,264
and the framers may have generally valued representative lawmaking over
direct popular legislation.265 As a final possibility, the framers may have
intended the clause to be an open-ended concession to state governments
that left each state to define its own legislative power.266 This may explain
why, after months of debate, the delegates could resolve the elector
appointment issue so easily, and why constitutional advocates gave
inconsistent explanations of Article II during the ratification debates. 267
The founders of the Constitution based its legitimacy on its derivation
from the people and designed the President to be the embodiment and
260. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 285 (arguing that state legislatures were granted
manner of appointment authority because they were the branch of government tied closest to
the people).
261. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 602 (statement of James
Madison, Aug. 24, 1787).
262. See Wilson, supra note 89, at 512.
263. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 388 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry, July 29, 1787) (finding that allowing states' governments to appoint electors would
attach state governments to the national system); The Records of the Federal Convention,
supra note 67, at 80 (statement of Elbridge Gerry, June 2, 1787) (preferring legislative
appointment because the people were "too little informed of personal characters in large
districts, and liable to deceptions").
264. See The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 364-65 (arguing that
appointment of senators by state legislatures produced the double advantage of "favoring a
select appointment" and linking state and federal governments); Amar, supra note 71, at
1352 (contending that the framers chose legislative election in Article I, Section 3 to protect
state interests and, to a lesser extent, to filter popular will); see also Journal of the Federal
Convention, supra note 50, at 388 (statement of Elbridge Gerry, July 29, 1787) (proposing
that all the constitutional election systems serve to tie states to the federal government);
Smith, supra note 52, at 753-54 (describing the apparent similarity between the rationale for
appointment of electors by state legislatures and Madison's justifications for the Article I,
Section 3 state legislative appointment of senators).
265. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
266. See Roche, supra note 91, at 810 (explaining that the Electoral College was
improvisational and unprincipled); Smith, supra note 52, at 737 (arguing that the phrase "in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct" was likely boilerplate or default
language due to its similarity with language in the Articles of Confederation).
267. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 28 (describing the inconsistencies in the
delegates' description of who would hold the true power of electing the President); supra
notes 116-19 and accompanying text (recounting various interpretations).
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protector of these ultimate sovereigns.268 This may have led to the stubborn
insistence of many of the delegates, during the dog days of the Philadelphia
summer, that the people should elect the President.269 Although the ideal of
popular election proved infeasible, 270 the delegates may have constructed
the Electoral College as a practical, if imperfect, mechanism by which the
people could exercise their sovereignty.271 A removed body of electors
could approximate the popular vote but overcome the perceived
impossibility of direct popular election; 272 and, of all the available options,
allowing a state legislature, the most democratic branch of state
government, to direct the manner of appointment could come closest to
letting the people decide.273
If the Electoral College was designed to facilitate the popular will, then a
popular initiative that brings the decision closer to the people would further,
rather than frustrate, the purpose of the framers. 274 That the framers did not
have available an orderly, practical form of statewide popular lawmaking
should not prevent Article II from now embracing the modem plebiscite.
275
Instead, the Constitution permits, and possibly even encourages, a state to
268. See The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 475 (arguing that
a bill of rights is unnecessary under the Constitution, which is "professedly founded upon the
power of the people" and where "the people surrender nothing").
269. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 21 (finding that "advocates of direct vote
were among the convention's more illustrious members-James Wilson, Gouverneur
Morris, and James Madison").
270. See Kuroda, supra note 7, at 9 (recounting that the delegates rejected popular
election out of specific impracticability concerns, including the impossibility that a census
could be taken before the first election, the varying suffrage requirements that existed in the
states, the high cost of supervising an election, and the risk a national popular election would
create domestic disturbances).
271. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 285 (writing that "the decision in the state legislatures
was intended to give the people the power to select the manner of choosing electors without
creating the perceived dangers of direct election by the people").
272. See The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 57, at 393 (finding it
"desirable that the sense of the people should operate" in the choice of the President, and that
this end could be accomplished by "committing the right of making it, not to any pre-
established body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the
particular conjuncture").
273. See Wilson, supra note 89, at 511-12 (arguing that giving manner of appointment
powers to state legislatures brought the decision as close to the people as practicable); see
also The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 297 (finding it "beyond doubt
that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their
respective states").
274. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 21 (contending that the arguments that
delegates made in favor of direct popular election were "better suited to future generations"
when practical obstacles would no longer exist); see also The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, supra note 67, at 80 (statement of Elbridge Gerry, June 2, 1787)
(expressing some approval of the idea of popular election, but "waiting till people [should]
feel more the necessity of it," as the "Community [was] not yet ripe").
275. See Kirby, supra note 47, at 501 (claiming that modem popular initiatives did not
exist at the time of the founding of the Constitution); see also Persily, supra note 24, at 16
(noting that South Dakota was the first state to create a modem popular initiative in 1898).
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direct the manner of appointing electors with the most democratic form of
rule making available.2 76
However, as the entire Constitution had to deal with the tension between
the ideal of democracy and the necessity of insulated and structurally
checked representative government, 277  the democracy-furthering
interpretation of Article II must confront the framers' preference for
representative government. 278  If the Electoral College rejected direct
election not because of its impracticability, but because it tended toward
tyranny, 279 then vesting state legislatures with the power to direct elector
appointment may have been an exclusive grant to an assembly body that
could filter the raw impulses of the popular will.280 And an additional
value-strengthening the tenuous tie between state governments and the
federal government, thereby increasing the legitimacy and acceptance of the
newly created dual system-would also accrue from vesting the power
exclusively in a sitting branch of state government.281 Fear of unbridled
democratic power and fidelity to a newly born federal system may have
driven the delegates to say that state legislatures-those assembly bodies
that could deliberate and then filter and strengthen the bonds of concurrent
sovereigns-shall direct the manner of appointing presidential electors.
According to this argument, a popular initiative would betray the
framers' purpose because it would make law without deliberation, thus
facilitating the tyranny of factions, 282 and dissolve the bond between state
government and federal government by allowing the people to determine
276. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 285.
277. See Brown, supra note 95, at 554 (noting that the tension "between the
implementation of popular will, on the one hand, and liberty, on the other" led to the belief
that only a deliberative, insulated legislative body could protect the liberty of minorities);
supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
278. See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 124-26 (describing
the virtues of representative government and the dangers of direct democracy). But see
Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and
Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1037, 1051-53 (2000) (arguing that the framers' understanding of the
deliberative qualities of Congress did not necessarily apply to state legislatures, which,
unlike Congress, did not need to be geographically diverse and could be instructed by
citizens, reflecting the "dominant mode of thought regarding the state governments in effect
before ratification [that] viewed legislatures as merely alter egos of the people").
279. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 433 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry, July 25, 1787) ("A popular election in this case is radically viscous. The ignorance of
the people would put it in the power of some one set of men.., acting in concert, to delude
them into any appointment.").
280. See The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 67, at 80 (statement
of Elbridge Gerry, June 2, 1787) (describing the virtues of deliberation in a system of
legislative appointment).
281. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 388 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry, July 29, 1787); Smith, supra note 52, at 753-54.
282. See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 126 (describing the
destructive and tyrannical tendency of direct democracy).
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the mode of appointing electors directly. 283 As the framers rejected the
forms of direct democracy available in the eighteenth century,284 they
would not allow a modem state to appoint electors using a popular initiative
that is lacking in the necessary and unique virtues of representative
lawmaking.
In contrast with the principled positions that Article II was designed
either to promote or restrict democracy, there is a third interpretation of the
original meaning: the words "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct" placed control in the general state legislative power, but did not
favor one form of lawmaking over another.285 Some have argued that the
clause was a concession to the states that left them discretion over how to
define their legislative power and how elector appointment would take
place. 286 Under this state-centered interpretation, the word "legislature"
was possibly chosen either because it was the customary form through
which states then exercised their sovereignty, 287 or because it allowed
prospective rule making, which the delegates may have found preferable to
leaving the decision to a more retrospective branch of state government. 288
In any event, the primary purpose of the language was to leave the manner
of appointment decision to the states, without federal interference. 289 This
would circumvent a stalemate on an issue that stymied the delegates
throughout the summer and would place a substantial power in the states
helping to promote balance in the Electoral College compromise. 290 This
helps make sense of the contradictions of the framers' interpretations of
Article II during the ratification debates. 291
283. See The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 67, at 80 (statement
of Elbridge Gerry, June 2, 1787) (arguing that popular election tends to "supersede
altogether the State authorities").
284. See Hamilton, supra note 107, at 2533 (describing the framers' rejection of a right to
instruct federal representatives); supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
285. See Smith, supra note 52, at 783 (describing the Elector Appointment Clause as a
compromise that "rejected a decisive role for state legislatures" and intended to empower
"the people of the state as much as, if not more than, the legislatures").
286. See McAfee, supra note 53, at 648 ("Those who feared a strong national government
were given a system that allowed states to determine their own method for choosing their
electors.").
287. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S 221, 228-29 (1920) (contending that the term
"legislature" was "not a term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution"
but a term that then meant "the representative body which made the laws of the people").
288. See Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 811, 838-40 (2001) (arguing that, by vesting power in the legislature, Article II implies
the manner of appointment must be directed before an election); Michael W. McConnell,
Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 662 (2001) (claiming that
the framers' decision to place manner of appointment power in state legislatures ensured that
states would "enact their rules in advance of any particular controversy").
289. See Smith, supra note 52, at 783.
290. See Roche, supra note 91, at 811 (summarizing the purpose of the Electoral College
as getting the convention "over the hurdle" of how the President would be elected by
protecting everyone's interests).
291. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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Under this interpretation, through directing the manner of appointment
by popular initiative, a state would properly act within its legislative
power.292 If Article II was primarily a grant of power to states, and the
term "legislature" was chosen simply because it was a common way states
exercised their sovereign powers, 293 or more substantially because the term
"legislature" facilitated prospective lawmaking, 294 then the proposed
initiative would further the framers' design. Allowing California to direct
the manner of appointment by popular initiative would leave ultimate
discretion to the states, without federal interference, through a mode that
many states now use to exercise their sovereignty and that still provides for
prospective lawmaking.
B. Analyzing the Initiative Under Judicial and Legislative Precedent
Over the past 220 years, numerous courts and legislatures have ventured
to interpret the meaning of the enigmatic Article II. These opinions deal
with two distinct, though interacting, issues. Some cases concern whether a
state constitution can substantively limit the discretion of its state
legislature under Article 11.295 This issue typically concerns whether a state
constitutional provision can limit the manner of appointment that a state
legislature directs. 296 Other cases concern whether a state constitution can
determine the process by which the manner of appointment is directed.
297
These cases ask whether direction by the "legislature" requires a specific
process under Article II or if the process can be defined by the state
constitution. 298 Parsing out questions of substance and process allows a
more specific inquiry into the constitutionality of the proposed California
initiative.
1. The Supreme Court's Line Between Substantive and
Procedural Limitations
The Supreme Court's decisions in Bush v. Gore and Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board show how the line between process and
292. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912) (declining to
find that a mechanism of direct democracy violated the Guarantee Clause of Article IV).
293. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1920).
294. See Friedman, supra note 288, at 836-40.
295. See State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Neb. 1948) (discussing
the conflict between a substantive state constitutional provision and the state legislature's
directed mode of appointment); Opinion of the Judges of the Supreme Court on the
Constitutionality of "An Act Providing for Soldier Voting," 37 Vt. 665, 666-67 (1864)
(issuing a narrow holding that dealt with a substantive conflict between a state constitutional
provision and an out-of-state soldier-voting law).
296. See, e.g., Marsh, 34 N.W.2d at 285-87.
297. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (describing how the Constitution
places the manner of appointment power in the legislature of the state); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 107 A. 705, 706-07 (Me. 1919) (discussing the constitutionality of using the
process of referendum to exercise Article II powers).
298. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. at 706-07.
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substance drives the Court's analysis. 299 In the unanimous Palm Beach
County opinion, 300 all the Justices seemed to recognize that Article II
provided some protection of the substance of a state legislature's chosen
manner of appointment from retrospective state constitutional limitation.
30 1
However, the Justices split in Bush v. Gore because some believed that
stopping the Florida Supreme Court's recount was necessary to protect the
substance of the legislature's enactment, 30 2 while others believed it would
only impermissibly interfere with state legislative process. 30 3 Chief Justice
Rehnquist framed the Florida court's action as a substantive limitation,
arguing that the state court's interpretation ran so afoul of the legislature's
intent that it would "wholly change the statutorily provided
appointment. '30 4 His objection was not that the law was subject to judicial
review, but that the judicial review so severely deviated from the legislative
intent that it altered the substance of the law. 305 Of course, by subjecting a
state court decision to greater scrutiny, this substance-based inquiry would
regulate state constitutional process by limiting the normal flexibility a state
court could use when interpreting state law. 306 However, the language of
Rehnquist's opinion focused on substance and never contended that Article
II made state legislatures independent of normal state constitutional
process. 307
Unlike Rehnquist, the dissenting Justices found that the Florida Supreme
Court did not substantively alter the legislature's chosen mode, 30 8 and,
299. See Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O'Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Ky. 1944)
(reconciling Supreme Court precedent by drawing a distinction between legislative process,
which is limited by state constitutions, and the substance of legislative enactments, which is
not); Kirby, supra note 47, at 504.
300. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
301. See Palm Beach County, 531 U.S. at 77-78 (finding that the decisions of the Florida
Supreme Court "may be read to indicate it construed the Florida Election Code without
regard to the extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2,
circumscribe the legislative power").
302. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (accepting the role
of judicial review until it conflicted with the legislature's chosen mode).
303. See id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
305. See id.; see also Tribe, supra note 199, at 190 (arguing that Rehnquist engaged in a
typical review of a state court's interpretation of a federal norm).
306. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
Yale L.J. 1407, 1416 (2001) (claiming that Rehnquist's substance-process distinction, that
the Florida Supreme Court can interpret Florida law as long as it does not change it, "enters a
realm of metaphysical speculation" because courts "change law whenever they interpret it").
According to Jack M. Balkin, the substance-procedure distinction only serves to mask the
real question of what standard of review to apply to the state court decision. See id.
307. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 113-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
308. See id. at 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Neither in this case, nor its earlier
opinion.., did the Florida Supreme Court make any substantive change in Florida Election
Law."); id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("None of the state court's interpretations is
unreasonable to the point of displacing the legislative enactment .... ); id. at 136 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) ("[D]isagreement with the Florida court's interpretation of its own State's law
does not warrant the conclusion that the justices of that court have legislated."); id. at 151
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Nor can one say that the [Florida Supreme] Court's ultimate
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therefore, Article II should not meddle with the ordinary legislative process
of the state. 309 However, none of these Justices held that every state court
action would be immune from Article II regulation, 310 just as Rehnquist did
not hold that Article II makes the state legislature wholly independent from
judicial review. 311  Instead, the disagreement between the dissenting
Justices and Rehnquist concerned what degree of scrutiny the Court should
apply to the state court decision. 312 Whether the recount was a substantive
change that justified Article II intervention was ultimately a function of the
level of judicial review each Justice applied. 313
2. Substantive State Constitutional Limitation of State Legislatures
State cases concerning whether an express state constitutional provision
could substantively limit a state legislature's chosen manner of appointment
provide a more straightforward application of the substance-process
distinction. Many of these cases upheld legislative enactments passed
pursuant to Article II that substantively conflicted with state
constitutions. 314 The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in a soldier-voting case
that arose during World War II, drew a clear distinction between substance
and process when upholding soldier-voting laws.315 The court found that,
though "the legislative process must be completed in the manner prescribed
by the State Constitution in order to result in a valid enactment," it "does
not necessarily follow that when functioning in the manner prescribed by
determination is so unreasonable as to amount to a constitutionally 'impermissible
distortion' of Florida law.").
309. See id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The legislative power in Florida is
subject to judicial review pursuant to Article V of the Florida Constitution, and nothing in
Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the state legislature from the constraints in the
state constitution that created it."); id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("By holding that
Article II requires our revision of a state court's construction of state laws in order to protect
one organ of the State from another, the Chief Justice contradicts the basic principle that a
State may organize itself as it sees fit.").
310. See id. at 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (considering whether the Florida decision
was a substantive change in violation of Article II); id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(considering whether the Florida court's decision was unreasonable to the point of displacing
Florida law); id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (considering whether the Florida court's
decision constituted legislating); id. at 151 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (evaluating whether the
Florida court's decision was an impermissible distortion of Florida law).
311. See id. at 113-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
312. See Tribe, supra note 199, at 185-94 (arguing that the Article II issue in Gore was a
red herring because all the justices gave some deference to the Florida Supreme Court, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis did not stray from the way the Court interprets other
federal constitutional norms).
313. See Balkin, supra note 306, at 1416 (arguing that the Rehnquist opinion ultimately
turned on the level of judicial review it applied).
314. See State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Neb. 1948) (holding that
Article II makes it unnecessary to consider a substantive conflict "between the method of
appointment of presidential electors directed by the Legislature and the state constitutional
provision"); In re Opinion of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665, 666-67 (1864) (upholding a soldier-
voting law despite a substantive conflict with a state constitutional provision).
315. See Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O'Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Ky. 1944).
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the State Constitution, the scope of its enactment is also limited by the
provisions of the state constitution. ' 31 6 Although dicta of some of these
state decisions moved beyond the substance question,3 17 they primarily
concerned the question of whether a specific state constitutional provision
could limit a mode of appointment that the legislature had already chosen,
not the means by which the legislature enacted that mode.318
Opinions that hold a state constitution cannot substantively limit the state
legislature's chosen manner of appointment would not necessarily render
the proposed California initiative unconstitutional. The initiative instead
concerns the separate question of whether Article II limits the authority of a
state constitution to define its own lawmaking process. However, these
opinions are still relevant to the initiative question because they recognize a
scenario in which Article II allows federal intervention into the relationship
between a state legislature and its state constitution. 319 Still, the question of
whether Article 1I allows the federal government to intervene to protect a
certain process from state constitutional limitation requires a distinct
constitutional analysis.
3. Procedural State Constitutional Limitation of State Legislatures
McPherson provided the Supreme Court's fullest discussion of whether
Article II allows a state constitution to define how it exercises its manner of
appointment powers or, instead, sets forth a specific process that a state
must follow. 320 The Supreme Court found that Article II meant that only
the legislative power of the state could direct the manner in which the state
appoints electors. 321  The Court thus asserted that the manner of
appointment must be directed by the state's legislative process, finding that
a state constitution could not divert this power from the legislative branch
to the executive or judicial branches. 322 However, the Court did not say
definitively what this legislative process must entail, or of what precisely a
316. Id.
317. See Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on the Constitutionality of
the Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N.H. 595, 599 (1864) (writing, with language broad enough to
forbid state constitutional limits on process, that "the Constitution of the State has no
concern with the question, except so far as it is referred to and adopted by the Constitution of
the United States").
318. See Kirby, supra note 47, at 504 (drawing the substance-process distinction after
reviewing state court cases).
319. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 70, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (describing
the special national interest of presidential elections).
320. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (noting that the Constitution does
not provide a specific mode for appointing electors, but instead "leaves it to the legislature
exclusively to define the method of effecting the object").
321. See id. at 26-27 (finding that the whole matter of how a state appoints its electors is
committed to the legislature).
322. See id. at 25 (reasoning that the insertion of the words "in such manner as the




state's "legislature" must consist. 323 As previously discussed, the opinion
could plausibly support a definition of legislature limited to a representative
assembly, 324 or one that allows other expressions of the "fundamental law
power. '325 Even language that seemingly asserts the primacy of state
legislatures over state constitutions might really be concerned with
preventing substantive limitations, not procedural ones.326 For instance, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the use of a referendum that gave
women the right to vote for electors, concluding that nothing in McPherson
prevented a state from defining its own legislative process under Article
11.327
Since McPherson left open whether Article II limits a state constitution
from defining its own legislative process, it could be constitutionally
reconciled with the proposed California initiative. Indeed, some language
from McPherson suggests an understanding that the fundamental law power
of a state might be reposed somewhere other than a representative
assembly, which could include placing lawmaking power in the people
through a popular initiative. 328 The opinion of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court shows that the proposed California initiative could be read as a
legitimate exercise of the lawmaking power of the state that is consistent
with Article II and McPherson.329
In contrast to the ambiguity of McPherson, some courts and legislative
bodies have adopted the strict understanding that "legislature" in Article II
refers to a specific legislative process, consisting of deliberative decision
making by the state's representative assembly, which a state constitution
cannot infringe. 330 Some state Civil War soldier-voting cases and the
majority report in Baldwin, all of which were issued before McPherson,
323. See id. ("What is forbidden or required to be done by a State is forbidden or required
of the legislative power under state constitutions as they exist.").
324. See id. at 27 (writing that the constitution "recognizes that the people act through
their representatives in the legislature").
325. See id. at 25 (finding that the people exercise their sovereignty "through their
representatives unless the fundamental law power is elsewhere reposed").
326. See id. at 35 (citing a Senate report that said "provisions" of statutes or the state
constitution that provided for popular election could not limit the authority of state
legislatures to define the manner of appointment, without discussing whether any limitations
exist on the process a state must use to enact those provisions (citing S. Rep. No. 43-395
(1874))).
327. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 705, 706 (Me. 1919) (holding that Article II
"means, simply that the state shall give expression to its will, as it must, of necessity,
through its law-making body, the Legislature" and that these "acts and resolves must be
passed and become effective in accordance with and in subjection to the Constitution of the
state, like all other acts and resolves having the force of law").
328. See Smith, supra note 52, at 776 (describing how "[b]oth sides of the independent
legislature debate look to this passage [from McPherson] for support").
329. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. at 706-07 (finding that a popular
referendum does not violate Article II).
330. See Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on the Constitutionality of
the Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N.H. 595, 599 (1864) (holding that the "whole subject is
entrusted to the State Legislature, subject to the control of Congress" and there can be "no
ground to question the power of the legislature to authorize voting for electors").
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concluded that Article II requires states to direct elector appointment
through a process of representative lawmaking. 33' These decisions used a
combination of textual and historical analysis to argue that the Constitution
consciously used the term "legislature" specifically to empower the
assembly body of the state. 332 They envisioned the most robust and fixed
idea of state "legislature" under Article I1-a representative body free from
both the substantive and procedural fetters of its state constitution. 333
Under this narrow interpretation, the proposed initiative would violate
Article II because it would direct the manner of appointing electors to the
exclusion of the term "legislature." Because the Constitution commits this
power exclusively to the representative body, any state constitutional
lawmaking process that allows a popular initiative to direct the manner of
appointment would impose an impermissible procedural limitation on the
state legislature. Examining the meaning of the term "legislature" that the
Court has assigned in other constitutional contexts may help determine
whether it makes sense to adopt this narrow understanding of "legislature"
in Article II, or instead embrace the broader definition of legislative power
put forth by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
C. Placing the Initiative Within the Functional Framework
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal
Constitution uses "legislature" in two distinct senses. 334 In some contexts,
legislature denotes the assembly body of state representatives; 335 in other
contexts, it denotes the lawmaking power of the state. 336  The first
definition is fixed and superintended by the Constitution;337 the latter is left
to the states.338 For example, the Court has held that the Constitution refers
exclusively to the formal assembly body when empowering state
legislatures to ratify constitutional amendments under Article V, prohibiting
ratification by other state legislative processes of direct democracy and
gubernatorial veto. 339  But then, the Court has held that the term
331. See Rowell, supra note 147, at 200-01 (describing the contested election case of
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, in which the majority report of the House Committee of Elections
held that the Constitution used the term "legislature" to refer exclusively to the
representative body).
332. See id. at 200 (quoting the majority report position that, when the Constitution
empowers the state legislature, it does so to the exclusion of the state constitution).
333. See id.
334. See supra Part I.E.
335. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1920).
336. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 567-68 (1916).
337. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 227-28 (asserting that the Constitution gave the term
"legislature" a definite meaning as the assembly body of the state in the context of Article
V).
338. See Davis, 241 U.S. at 568 (finding that, insofar as a referendum was part of the
legislative power under the state constitution, it was an act of the legislature under Article I,
Section 4 of the Constitution).
339. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 227-28 (prohibiting referendum); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S.
130, 137 (1922) (prohibiting veto).
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"legislature" in Article I, Section IV refers to the state's legislative power,
allowing that power to determine the time, manner, and place of
congressional elections through its own process, which can include forms of
direct democracy or a governor's veto. The Court has provided a concise
explanation for these two definitions of the term "legislature": when the
Constitution requires a state legislature to make law, that law should be
enacted by the state's ordinary legislative process; however, when the
Constitution asks the state legislature to do something different than
lawmaking, only the assembly body can perform that special function. 340
The functional inquiry into Article II must therefore begin by asking
whether a state legislature makes law or does something else when it directs
the manner in which a state appoints presidential electors.
One working definition of the "legislative" power of a state is "the power
to establish general rules of prospective application." 34 1  When state
legislatures prescribe the time, place, and manner of congressional
elections, they legislate, in the sense that they set rules in advance for the
future election to follow. 342 The term "prescribe" refers to the power to
ordain future action,343 and the setting of the time, place, and manner of an
election necessarily requires making rules of general application.
Accordingly, Article I, Section 4 powers are exercised by the legislative
power of the state, whatever the state constitution defines that to be.
The Supreme Court noted the similarity between the construction of
Article II, Section 1 and Article I, Section 4 in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.344 To direct the manner in which the state appoints electors may
require, like the power to prescribe under Article I, Section 4, the state
legislature to establish general rules of prospective application. 345 The term
"direct" is synonymous with "prescribe" and likewise means to set forth a
future course of action.346 Directing the manner of elector appointment will
typically require a state legislature to construct a statewide election process,
which will involve making rules of general application analogous to the
340. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
341. John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer 2002, at 41, 44; see also Koenig v. Flynn, 179 N.E. 705, 707 (N.Y. 1932) (defining
a legislative act as the "prescribing or enacting of a rule or direction, which must be followed
and obeyed by the people of the state").
342. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365-66 ("Article I, § 4, plainly gives authority to the State to
legislate within the limitations therein named.").
343. See Koenig, 179 N.E. at 707.
344. 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) ("This duty parallels the duty under Article II .... These
Clauses are express delegations of power to the States to act with respect to federal
elections."). The opinion also found similarity between the clauses in that the Constitution
treats both the President and congressional representatives as federal officers. See id.
345. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 124 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing that
it is "perfectly clear" that Article II parallels Article I, Section 4 rather than Article V
because Article 1, Section 4 and Article II "both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking
capacity").
346. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 512 (4th ed. 2000)




rules state legislatures promulgate under Article I, Section 4.347 Under
these rationales, Article II requires state legislatures to make law, and the
Constitution thus commits the power to determine the manner of
appointment to the legislative power of the state, rather than the formal
assembly.
Under this broader definition of "legislature," Article II would allow a
state to define the lawmaking process by which it determines the manner of
elector appointment. The California Constitution defines the popular
initiative as part of its lawmaking power,348 and an initiative acts
legislatively in the sense that it establishes rules of prospective
application. 349 Were a court to interpret "legislature" in Article 1I to mean
"legislative power," the constitutionality of the California initiative would
be difficult to question.
However, there is a wrinkle in the functional analysis of Article II.
Recall the Supreme Court's position that, when the Constitution asks a state
legislature to do something nonlegislative, it exclusively references the
state's formal assembly body.350 These special functions do not require the
legislature to make prospective rules of general application. Instead, special
functions are discrete acts that require no ongoing legal enforcement and
implementation; they are self-contained and bounded in a way that
lawmaking is not.351 In addition to holding that the Article V power to
ratify constitutional amendments entails a special function, the Court has
suggested that several other constitutional grants to state legislatures
involve similarly nonlegislative acts.352 Specifically, the Court indicated
that the power to elect senators, which state legislatures possessed pursuant
to Article I, Section 3 prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, was one such
special power that the Constitution gave exclusively to the assembly
bodies. 353 The casting of ballots involves a simple, absolute action that
does not require prospective rule making. 354 Significantly, states have
interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment provision, which says the time,
place, and manner of holding elections shall be determined by each state's
347. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 124 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
348. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
349. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 567-68 (1916) (holding that
another mechanism of direct democracy, a popular referendum, qualified as lawmaking
under Article I, Section 4).
350. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1920).
351. See id. at 231 (writing that "legislative action is entirely different from the
requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a proposed
amendment to the Constitution").
352. See id. at 227-28 (describing other constitutional provisions where "legislature"
refers to an assembly body).
353. See id. at 228 (finding that Congress and the states understood that "election by the
people was entirely distinct from the legislative action" of electing senators under Article I,
Section 3).
354. See Amar, supra note 278, at 1069 (explaining that state legislatures enjoyed
independence in selecting senators in the decades after the Constitution was written).
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legislature, to apply generally to the state lawmaking process. 355 This
highlights the constitutional distinction between the nonlegislative act of
casting the vote itself and the legislative act of making the rules under
which that vote will be cast.
The broad plenary power that state legislatures possess under Article II
might complicate the functional analysis. If a state legislature chose to
appoint electors by some form of popular statewide election, such direction
of appointment would involve lawmaking similar to the lawmaking
required by Article I, Section 4.356 However, if the legislature directed that
they would appoint the electors themselves, 357 such a decision seems no
more prospective or general in application than legislative election of
senators under Article I, Section 3. By allowing the legislature to act either
as general election rule promulgator or simple self-appointer, the manner of
appointment power seems to straddle the Supreme Court's dichotomy
between functions legislative and nonlegislative. 358 The self-appointment
capacity for which the clause allows forms a basis for the argument that the
manner of appointment power is vested only in the formal assembly body
of the state, and the proposed initiative is therefore unconstitutional.
However, this special function might only be illusory, resulting from an
argument that conflates the manner of appointment and the act of
appointment itself. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 separates the power to
appoint, which it places in states, from the power to direct the manner of
appointment, which it places in state legislatures. 359 If a state legislature
directed that it would self-appoint, its power to do so would derive not from
its manner of appointment power, but from the state's appointment power,
which the legislature can only exercise from its authority to act on behalf of
the state. 360 Therefore, Article II and Article I, Section 3 are formally
different because, rather than vesting the power to elect senators
specifically in state legislatures, Article II vests the power to appoint
electors in the states. Further, as a functional matter, the direction that the
355. See Koza et al., supra note 19, at 328.
356. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Article
II is most similar to Article I, Section 4, which gives state legislatures powers to regulate
congressional elections).
357. See id. at 104 (per curiam) (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 7 (1892))
(noting that "the State legislature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is
plenary; it may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed was the manner used
by State legislatures in several States for many years after the Framing of our Constitution").
358. See Cmty. Rights Counsel, The Effort by California Republicans to Use a Ballot
Initiative to Trump the California Legislature's Allocation of California's Electors for the
2008 Election Is Unconstitutional,
http://www.communityrights.org/newsroom/CaliforniaBallotLegalAnalysis.asp (last visited
Mar. 9, 2008).
359. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (distinguishing between powers of the state and the
state legislature by holding that "Each State shall appoint" and this appointment shall occur
"in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct").
360. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25 ("The State does not act by its people in their




state legislature would appoint the electors themselves would resemble
lawmaking. Legislatures would still choose from various courses of action
and their decision would still bind the state's future appointment of electors.
Therefore, as a functional and formal matter, the capacity to self-appoint
under Article II might not turn the power into a special, nonlegislative
function. The Constitution does not require the legislature to perform the
nonlegislative function of appointment; rather, it gives the legislature broad
power to set forth a prospective manner of appointment that allows, but by
no means requires, appointment to be made by the legislature on behalf of
the state. 361
Even if the functional analysis suggests that a state legislature performs a
legislative function when directing the manner of appointment, there may
be other ways to distinguish Article II from Article I, Section 4.
Presidential elections might implicate unique interests that require deviation
from a strict functional analysis.3 62 In addition, risks posed by popular
initiatives could carry special significance in the context of the Electoral
College. 363 The following section discusses the particular concerns and
interests that exist in the context of a presidential election.
D. Evaluating the Initiative in Light of the
Special National Interest of Presidential Elections
Although analogies to other constitutional provisions can illuminate the
meaning of the Elector Appointment Clause, the Constitution's system for
electing the President in many ways is a creature unto itself. Unlike a
congressional election, in which states separately elect local representatives,
Article II requires states to cooperate when electing a national executive.3 64
If a state legislature changes the manner of appointment so as to alter which
electors the state appoints, this influences not only the state's choice but the
other states' choices as well. 365  This national interest might justify
heightened federal oversight of state action under Article 11.366 If popular
initiatives pose special risks to the structure of the Electoral College,367 this
national interest might provide a basis for making it unconstitutional for a
state to direct the manner of appointment by plebiscite. On the other hand,
if this unique national interest only justifies a constitutional prohibition of
ex post, retrospective elector appointment, a popular initiative, as
prospective lawmaking, would not violate Article II.
361. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
362. See supra Part I.E.
363. See Eule, supra note 102, at 1525-29 (describing the lack of structural safeguards in
popular initiatives).
364. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983) (arguing that the state has a
lesser interest in a presidential election due to its national character).
365. See Hertzberg, supra note 9, at 21-22 (describing how the proposed California
initiative would have changed the 2004 election).
366. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
367. See Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. Chi. L. Sch.
Roundtable 17, 18-23 (1997) (noting the corruption risks posed by popular initiatives).
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The special character of presidential elections may warrant reducing the
ordinary federal deference to the state's internal legislative process. Each
state's stake in electing the President exists relative to the other states; if
one state legislature changes its manner of appointment in order to swing an
election toward a certain candidate, the relative power of the other states
also changes. The Supreme Court has based limited substantive federal
regulation of presidential elections upon this interest, 368 and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore would have used this
principle to assert greater federal scrutiny over a state court's interpretation
of its legislature's chosen manner of appointment. 369 The national interest
of a presidential election might further justify a constitutional limit on the
legislative process that directs the manner in which a state appoints electors.
1. Lack of Structural Safeguards in Direct Democracy
Popular initiatives may facilitate heightened risks of corruption and
manipulation that offend the design of the Electoral College and call for
constitutional prohibition based on the special national character of
presidential elections. One reason some of the framers objected to the
direct election of the President was the risk that the people's votes would be
driven by powerful private interests. 370 A manner of appointment direction
made by popular initiative, a process that lacks deliberation and
accountability, 371 may be more exploitable by a single faction or interest
group. 372 The low voter turnout for initiative measures may compound the
risk that an interest group, or political party, will lead voters to direct a
manner of appointment that is designed to assist a chosen candidate. 373 A
popular initiative that directed the manner of appointment would
circumvent the Electoral College's deliberative design and increase the risk
of election manipulation. 374
368. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795 ("[T]he State has a less important interest in
regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local elections, because the outcome of the
former will be largely determined by voters beyond the State's boundaries."); Burroughs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
369. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
370. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 433 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry, July 25, 1787) ("A popular election in this case is radically viscous. The ignorance of
the people would put it in the power of some one set of men ... acting in concert, to delude
them into any appointment.").
371. See Eule, supra note 102, at 1525-29 (arguing that direct initiatives lack the process
that provides for compromise by locating common interests through deliberation and
debate).
372. See Garrett, supra note 367, at 18-23 (describing the role of organized interest
groups in driving the initiative process and the dangers it poses to minority rights).
373. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 13, 32-34 (1995) (describing the influence of
interest groups and risks posed by lower turnout).
374. The Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 67, at 80 (statement of Elbridge




However, as U.S. election history makes apparent, deliberation gives no
guarantee that lawmakers will act in the public good either-formal state
assembly bodies often chose the manner of appointment that would elect
their desired candidate. 375  Still, the other quality of representative
lawmaking-accountability-may lessen the risk that modem lawmakers
will direct a politically motivated manner of appointment that diminishes
the force of the popular will. Before popular suffrage became the norm in
the 1820s, appointment by a state legislature may not have offended the
expectations of citizens to the same degree.376 However, after nearly 200
years of most states appointing presidential electors by statewide general
election, if legislators today sought to change the outcome of an election by
changing the manner of appointment, the citizens of the state would likely
hold them accountable in the next election.377
If a popular initiative is more susceptible to corruption and manipulation
of outcome, the California initiative may be unconstitutional because it
undermines the safeguards of the design of Article II. The unique national
interest in presidential elections would justify federal intervention to
prohibit a state from directing the manner by which it appoints electors to
include the legislative process of popular initiative.
2. Prospective Lawmaking in Elections
The national interest could also justify reading "legislature" narrowly to
require that the manner of appointment decision is made by the prospective
rule-making branch of state government. 378 This argument begins with the
premise that constitutional elections should produce legitimate and orderly
outcomes. 379  The Elector Appointment Clause serves this end by
"requiring the manner of selection of electors to be specified in advance by
the [state] legislature ... [which] limits the ability of political actors to rig
the rules in favor of their candidate. '380 Such an interpretation reinforces
the framers' concerns about corrupting influences 381 and furthers values of
375. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (recounting efforts by state
legislatures to manipulate outcomes in the first presidential elections).
376. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 45 (describing the popular resistance to state
legislative appointment in the 1820s).
377. See Steinhauer, supra note 13 (describing North Carolina's legislature's plan to
change the state to a district system prior to the 2008 election, and the resistance it received
from national party leaders).
378. See Friedman, supra note 288, at 838-41 (arguing that it makes sense to interpret
Article II to provide for ex ante rule making).
379. See Posner, supra note 167, at 155-56 (arguing that insulating legislative action
under Article II from interference from other branches of state government would minimize
the risk of uncertainty caused by interbranch disputes over electors).
380. McConnell, supra note 288, at 662.
381. See supra notes 57, 62 and accompanying text.
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certainty and finality. 382 Additionally, as a policy matter, having elections
run according to clear rules ensures more fair and neutral results.383
For these reasons, the substance of laws passed by the legislature
determining the manner of appointing presidential electors might be free
from undue interference from the state constitution after they are enacted,
so as not to lead to competing interpretations of electoral votes.384
According to the argument, state courts may be able to resolve internal
ambiguities of the laws within limits, but a state court should never interpret
the legislative enactment so as to distort the legislature's purpose or
subordinate that purpose to the state constitution.385
This provides a policy rationale for the distinction some courts have
drawn between regulations on process and regulations on substance. It
would allow a state to define how it distributes its legislative power before
an election because this does not undermine the result by second-guessing
the assembly's decision.386  This interpretation argues that "state
legislatures are limited by [state] constitutional provisions for veto,
referendum, and initiative in prescribing the manner of choosing
presidential electors, but the state constitutional provisions ... do not limit
the substantive terms of legislation." 387 Because the proposed California
initiative entails prospective rule making, it would not violate the purpose
of Article II's delegation to state legislatures.
III. ORIGINAL PRAGMATISM: CONTEMPORARY POLICY TO FURTHER
THE PURPOSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The Electoral College, while embodying the compromises of the
Convention and managing a multitude of seemingly irreconcilable interests,
still possesses a certain narrow and idiosyncratic character formed from the
particular circumstances that created it.388 Any attempt to apply larger
constitutional principles to the structure of the Electoral College should thus
382. See Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 757, 760-65 (2001)
(arguing that the Supreme Court made an extralegal decision for certainty and finality in
Bush v. Gore).
383. See generally Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the
Law of Democracy, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 65 (2002) (claiming that elections should run
with a combination of rules and standards in order to maximize fairness).
384. See Kirby, supra note 47, at 501; Posner, supra note 167, at 157 (arguing that Article
II should allow legislatures to delegate authority to other branches of state government, "but
[a state legislature] must make clear that it is doing this and act in advance of the Presidential
election").
385. See Posner, supra note 167, at 156 (arguing that, while this interpretation is not
required by case law, history, or constitutional language, "it is consistent with the concern
expressed at the constitutional convention ... with preventing the choice of the President by
cabals, intrigue, corruption, or agents of foreign powers").
386. See id. at 156-57 ("[I]nterpreting the 'Manner directed' clause to forbid a state's
governor or courts to change the electoral rules laid down by the legislature... operates to
reduce malign influences on the selection of electors.").
387. Kirby, supra note 47, at 504.
388. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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proceed cautiously. This seems especially true with the Elector
Appointment Clause, which, as evidenced from subsequent amendment
efforts and statements by the delegates, may have been originally designed
as a temporary fix.389 History suggests that the delegates, unable to settle
on a definite manner of appointment, placed the decision in the hands of the
various state legislatures until a consensus could be reached.390 This
interpretation does not deny that the delegates likely had specific reasons
for vesting this power in the state legislature, but it recognizes that the
clause was primarily motivated by their failure to reach a uniform mode.
Although a consensus did eventually emerge in the form of statewide
general election, this manner of appointment was never committed to the
Constitution by amendment. 391 Still, as statewide popular appointment
became more entrenched, the wide discretion state legislatures formally
enjoyed became increasingly bound by the subtle chains of custom and the
democratic expectations of the voting public. 392 This may explain the
confused and astounded response to Article II arguments during the 2000
election dispute-by then, how many Americans could still recall that a
state legislature had any special constitutional role to play in the election of
the President? 393
One byproduct of the 2000 election may have been a renaissance in legal
and political study of Article II. In the run-up to the 2008 election,
members of both the Republican and Democratic parties have sought to
exploit the special role that Article II prescribes for state legislatures-the
power to direct the manner in which a state appoints its electors-to
advance their immediate political ends.394 This Note discussed the question
of whether one such effort, California Initiative No. 07-0032, is
constitutional. To resolve this question, the Note looked at the history of
Article II, the legal interpretations of the manner of appointment power, and
a functional comparison between the various powers the Constitution vests
in state legislatures. These inquiries yielded few definite answers; they
more often pointed in opposite directions, moving the quest no closer to
discovering the true meaning of the Elector Appointment Clause.
Rather than attempting to distill a definitive meaning, out of all these
vague and illusive possibilities, which would be either fruitless or
disingenuous, this Note bases its argument on policy. However, to stress
389. See Smith, supra note 52, at 737 (noting that the parallel language of Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2 and Article V of the Articles of Confederation suggests that the clause
was a default provision).
390. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
392. See Peirce & Longley, supra note 6, at 45 (describing public resistance to state
legislative appointment once the norm of popular election took root).
393. See Toner, supra note 1 (describing the public's reaction to the 2000 Florida election
dispute).
394. See Steinhauer, supra note 13 (describing efforts by the North Carolina legislature
and Republicans in California to change their states' manners of appointment).
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the necessity of a policy-based analysis, a brief summary of the various
bases of interpretation, and their ultimate flaws, proves helpful.
The original and historical materials allow several possible and
contradictory interpretations of the Elector Appointment Clause. On one
hand, the delegates, although fundamentally faithful to the ideal of
democracy and the popular election of the President, eventually realized
that a nationwide popular election would create logistical obstacles
impossible to overcome. 395 They decided that allowing state legislatures to
direct the manner of appointment, although inferior to pure popular
election, could place the choice of appointment as close to the people as the
practicalities allowed. 396 The delegates clung to the ideal that, when the
circumstances improved, future generations could amend the Constitution
to provide for uniform popular election. 397 Under this interpretation, the
California initiative would not only be constitutional, but also would fully
embody the democratic intent of the delegates.
On the other hand, the delegates may have sought to remove the
presidential election from the people, placing the power to elect in an
exclusive body of electors and the power to determine the manner in which
electors are appointed in a deliberative body of representatives. 398 The
people, prone to passion and faction, could not be trusted with the mighty
task of electing a President.399 Under this interpretation, the California
initiative would violate the framers' manifest intent to prohibit direct
democracy from electing the President.
Finally, the Elector Appointment Clause might have had no special
purpose, intended instead to remove an obstacle to compromise by placing
the power in the general lawmaking authority of the states. 400 Under this
interpretation, the California initiative would be a permissible exercise of
the lawmaking authority of the state.
In the final analysis, these interpretations are equally true or equally
false, depending on one's point of view. Delegates who favored democracy
might have embraced the initiative; those who feared democracy might
have rejected it; those weary of national power might have accepted it out
of deference to the states. The problem with the original analysis is that it
assumes that the delegates were driven by one overriding intent. Such a
unified purpose is especially strange to impose on the Electoral College,
which was designed only to reconcile conflicting interests under the
395. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
396. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 285.
397. See Letter from James Madison to George Hay, supra note 23, at 147 (regretting the
failure of the delegates to achieve uniformity and advocating an amendment).
398. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text.
399. See Journal of the Federal Convention, supra note 50, at 433 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry, July 25, 1787) (arguing that popular election posed risks of tyranny); The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 67, at 80 (statement of Elbridge Gerry, June 2,
1787) (describing the virtues of deliberation in a system of legislative appointment).
400. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
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umbrella of a mutually acceptable, if gawky, mechanism for electing the
President.401
The lack of a clear constitutional purpose for the clause may explain the
vagueness with which courts and legislative bodies have interpreted it.
Most, though not all, of these cases draw a line between the substance of a
state legislature's chosen manner of appointment, which state constitutions
cannot limit,40 2 and the legislative process by which the manner of
appointment occurs, which a state can define.40 3 Still, as illustrated in Bush
v. Gore, there is no bright line between substance and process, as ostensibly
substantive limitations on state constitutions can often cause procedural
limitations as well.40 4 Additionally, some interpretations suggest a certain
core of process that a state constitution cannot take away from a
legislature.40 5 Therefore, although these interpretations give guidance, they
provide scant specific indication of whether Article II allows a state to
direct the manner of appointment by popular initiative.
The functional analysis also leaves the question unresolved. It could lead
to the conclusion that Article II requires lawmaking, which means that it
can be exercised according to the state constitution's normal legislative
process.406 However, presidential elections could require deviation from
the ordinary functional analysis, suggesting that the functional rationale
may not neatly apply to Article II.
Therefore, this Note bases its ultimate resolution of the issue on a
barefaced policy rationale. Because the fairness of an election is essential
to the legitimacy of the result, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 should be
read to encourage fair elections. Interpreting Article II to require
prospective lawmaking407 and encourage uniformity promotes fairness.408
Although the historical, functional, and legal interpretations remain
relevant, when there is doubt or ambiguity Article II should ultimately be
read to further the policy aim of good elections. This Note posits that good
elections result from a system that encourages all the parties to play by
similar rules that are fixed in advance of the vote.
Prospective rule making is essential because it makes postelection
manipulation less likely. 409 After an election, decision makers are better
positioned to appreciate the political consequences of their actions.410
Before an election, they maintain the blissful ignorance of not
401. See Roche, supra note 91, at 811.
402. See Commonwealth ex rel. Dunmit v. O'Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Ky. 1944).
403. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 107 A. 705, 706 (Me. 1919).
404. See supra notes 302-13 and accompanying text.
405. See Tribe, supra note 199, at 185-94 (arguing that fundamental procedural limits
exist that would prevent a state constitution from placing the power to direct the manner of
appointment in a plebiscite or court).
406. See supra notes 341-49 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 375-77 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
410. See McConnell, supra note 288, at 662.
2998 [Vol. 76
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
understanding how the rules will influence the result.411 Reading Article II
to require states to determine the manner of appointment in advance of
elections diminishes the risk of manipulation. It provides a sound policy
basis for why the Constitution vested the power to direct rules of elector
appointment in the state legislature, the rule-promulgating branch of state
government. The use of the term "direct" gives additional textual support
for this prospective interpretation. 412
This interpretation would not require federal interference with normal
state legislative process that applies to other acts passed by the assembly
body. A state legislature's directed manner of appointment should remain
subject to a governor's veto, and state courts should resolve ambiguities as
they would for any piece of state law. However, a state constitution could
not determine the manner of appointment retrospectively by a
nonlegislative mechanism. By interpreting the Elector Appointment Clause
to require that only a prospective legislative act can direct the mode of
appointment, Article II reduces the risk of election corruption.
Uniformity promotes fair and legitimate elections. The United States has
now achieved a largely uniform manner of appointing electors.413 Article II
should be interpreted to diminish the risk that a state could disrupt this de
facto uniformity by changing its manner of appointment to further
immediate political ends. If nothing else can be gathered from the
delegates' debates, they show a persistent desire to reach a consensus on a
uniform mode of appointment.414 The laments of Madison thirty-five years
after the Constitutional Convention reinforce the idea that uniformity was
something the delegates sought but could never accomplish. 415
The constitutionality of the proposed California initiative should turn in
part on whether such initiatives encourage or discourage uniformity.
Today, formal state assembly bodies seem unlikely to alter a state's manner
of appointment to advance a chosen candidate. 416 This is largely because of
voter accountability, although structural checks and deliberation may also
make the formal assembly a less likely manipulator. 417 However, lacking
institutional checks and a mechanism for accountability, a popular initiative
can more easily be hijacked by a factional interest. 418 The low voter
turnout in special elections increases the risk that a political party could
change a state's manner of appointment in a way that would disrupt
uniformity. 419  To further the aim of uniformity, the meaning of
"legislature" in Article II should be interpreted narrowly to exclude a
411. See id.
412. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
413. See Hertzberg, supra note 9, at 21.
414. See supra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
415. See Letter from James Madison to George Hay, supra note 23, at 147.
416. See supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 371-73 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
419. See Garrett, supra note 367, at 18-23 (describing the role of organized interest
groups in driving the initiative process and the dangers such groups pose to minority rights).
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popular initiative from directing the manner in which a state appoints its
electors.
CONCLUSION
In light of its pragmatic origins, the Electoral College should be
interpreted to enable fair and legitimate elections. To that end, the meaning
of the Elector Appointment Clause should encourage state uniformity and
minimize corruption. In our time, the structural deficiencies of popular
initiatives make them more susceptible to political rule manipulation that
would disrupt state uniformity. Because they are not subject to the check of
electoral accountability, initiatives pose a heightened risk that the people,
"mislead by the artful representations of interested men," will adopt a
manner of appointment designed to further a specific presidential
candidate.420 The low voter turnout for early popular initiative ballot
measures exacerbate the danger that partisan interests will enact politically
advantageous rule changes under the guise of democratic reform.421 For
these reasons, reading "legislature" in Article II to exclude popular
initiatives will lead to more honest and fair elections. This resonates with
the original purpose of the Electoral College. While the framers disagreed
about which lofty principles informed the Electoral College, they all
appreciated that its practical value lay in promoting well-run and
uncorrupted elections. Rather than attempting to graft extrinsic theoretical
purposes onto the strange shape of the Electoral College, the interpretation
should consider immediate exigencies of policy and thus find consistency
with the original design.
420. The Federalist No. 63 (James Madison), supra note 57, at 371.
421. See Garrett, supra note 367, at 18-23; supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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